Patna High Court 2021: Teacher Recruitment Is Executive Prerogative—No Vested Right for STET Candidates

Patna High Court 2021: Teacher Recruitment Is Executive Prerogative -No Vested Right for STET Candidates

The Patna High Court, in a 2021 decision, clarified that candidates who cleared the State Teacher Eligibility Test (STET) do not acquire a vested right to appointment merely because teaching posts exist or have been sanctioned. The Court emphasized that decisions to initiate, time, and scale recruitment are matters of executive policy, subject to bona fide considerations like budget and administrative need. The writ petition filed by a group of aspirants was disposed of with liberty to approach the appropriate forum if, in the future, any adverse and unlawful condition is imposed during consideration of their candidature.

Simplified Explanation of the Judgment

A large group of STET-qualified aspirants (the “petitioners”) approached the High Court seeking a mandamus directing the State and the Bihar School Examination Board (BSEB) to (i) add or amalgamate 33,916 sanctioned posts of teachers for the sixth phase of recruitment, (ii) fill all vacant sanctioned posts from successful STET candidates of earlier cycles (notably the 2011/2012 batch) before considering candidates from a fresh recruitment test, and (iii) appoint the petitioners first against social science vacancies that had remained unfilled since 2017 and were subsequently re-sanctioned in 2020. In essence, the petitioners wanted the Court to compel the State to immediately complete a large-scale recruitment exercise and to prioritize their batch.

The State opposed the petition. It argued that (a) no candidate acquires a vested right to appointment simply by qualifying an eligibility test or because posts exist; (b) the government has already laid out a plan for recruitments and will proceed in accordance with policy, budgetary capacity, and administrative exigency; and (c) the Court should not fix a timeline or compel recruitment because such decisions lie primarily within the executive domain. The State also relied on precedent, including a Supreme Court judgment (P. Suseela v. UGC), to argue that additional eligibility conditions and recruitment policy choices do not create enforceable rights in favor of candidates who have not been appointed.

The Court carefully assessed these submissions. It began by noting a foundational point: the mere existence of a government “programme and schedule” for recruitment does not, by itself, bind the State in such a way that courts can compel completion of the process. Whether, when, and how many posts to fill are decisions reserved to the executive, which must weigh practical factors such as finances and the pressing needs of public administration. Therefore, the Court declined to exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to direct immediate recruitment or to prescribe a timetable.

To explain the legal position, the Court relied on settled Supreme Court law. In S.S. Balu v. State of Kerala, the Supreme Court had held that inclusion in a select list does not create a legal right to appointment; the State may fill all, some, or none of the vacancies as long as it acts bona fide and without arbitrariness. A Constitution Bench in Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India similarly clarified that a recruitment notification is essentially an invitation to apply; selection does not automatically translate into an “indefeasible right” to be appointed. The High Court quoted these principles and reaffirmed that courts cannot force the State to fill posts unless discrimination or arbitrariness is shown.

The Court also cited State of Orissa v. Raj Kishore Nanda, where the Supreme Court underscored that initiating a selection process for a particular year is exclusively the employer’s prerogative. There may be vacancies, but financial constraints or policy considerations can legitimately delay recruitment; tribunals and courts lack the competence to order the State to initiate or complete such processes. Against that backdrop, the Court concluded that it could not issue a writ compelling the State of Bihar to (a) merge or “amalgamate” sanctioned posts into a specific recruitment phase, (b) mandatorily fill every vacancy from a particular STET batch, or (c) complete recruitment within a fixed timeframe.

Addressing the petitioners’ apprehension that the validity of their earlier STET qualification might expire before the State completes recruitment, the Court treated that concern as speculative at the present stage. The State had already extended the life of the relevant panel by two years, and the government could consider further measures if warranted. If, in the future, any policy change or eligibility condition unfairly prejudices these candidates—say, by retroactively disqualifying them from consideration—the petitioners would remain free to approach the competent forum. But a court cannot, in anticipation of hypothetical harm, micromanage recruitment policy or timelines.

Ultimately, the High Court disposed of the writ petition without granting the mandamus sought. It reiterated the limited role of judicial review in public employment: courts guard against illegality, arbitrariness, and discrimination, but they do not substitute their judgment for executive policy choices—particularly in matters involving finances, staffing, and administrative priorities. At the same time, by granting “liberty to move again” if unlawful adverse conditions are later imposed, the Court preserved the petitioners’ right to challenge any eventual illegality.

Significance or Implication of the Judgment (For general public or government)

This ruling is significant for both aspirants and the State administration:

  • For aspirants: Clearing an eligibility test (like STET) is only a qualifying step, not a guarantee of appointment. Candidates should be prepared for delays, phased recruitments, and policy shifts driven by budgets and administrative needs. The key legal takeaway is that courts will intervene only if the State acts arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or contrary to statutory rules—not simply because posts remain vacant.
  • For the government: The judgment reaffirms executive autonomy in workforce planning. The State can prioritize recruitment phases, defer hiring due to fiscal constraints, or redesign processes—provided the decisions are bona fide and respect comparative merit once selection commences. This reduces litigation pressure to “fill every vacancy now,” while reminding authorities to act transparently to avoid arbitrariness.
  • For the public: The Court’s approach balances the need for adequate staffing in schools with responsible financial management. It signals that judicial directions to hire en masse will not be issued unless there is clear legal wrongdoing. This preserves space for policy-driven planning in vital public services like education.

Legal Issue(s) Decided and the Court’s Decision with reasoning

  • Whether STET-qualified candidates acquire a vested right to appointment because vacancies exist or posts are sanctioned.
    • Decision: No vested right accrues merely from qualification or the existence of vacancies. Appointment arises only when the State initiates and completes recruitment in accordance with law. Reasoning: Supreme Court precedents (Shankarsan Dash; S.S. Balu) hold that selection or inclusion in a panel does not create an indefeasible right to appointment.
  • Whether the Court can compel the State to complete recruitment, amalgamate posts into a particular phase, or fix a time schedule.
    • Decision: No. These are executive policy matters. Courts refrain from issuing mandamus to fill posts or to commence selection, absent illegality, arbitrariness, or discrimination. Reasoning: State of Orissa v. Raj Kishore Nanda affirms the employer’s prerogative over initiation and timing of recruitment, especially when financial constraints are relevant.
  • Whether apprehended expiry of qualification/panel justifies immediate judicial directions.
    • Decision: No. The concern is premature; the State has already extended panel life, and further steps can be considered if needed. Petitioners have liberty to challenge any future adverse conditions. Reasoning: Courts do not act on hypothetical harm; relief requires concrete illegality or prejudice.

Judgments Referred by Parties (with citations)

  • P. Suseela & Ors. v. University Grants Commission & Ors., (2015) 8 SCC 129 — cited for the proposition that additional eligibility norms and changes do not create vested rights absent appointment.
  • CWJC No. 20095 of 2019 & analogous cases (order dated 18.02.2020) — a coordinate Bench direction regarding making vacancies up to June 2019 available to STET 2012 qualifiers; petitioners relied on it to press for recruitment.

Judgments Relied Upon or Cited by Court (with citations)

  • S.S. Balu v. State of Kerala, (2009) 2 SCC 479 — extract reiterated: mere inclusion in a select list does not confer a right to appointment; the State may choose to fill or not fill vacancies, subject to bona fide action.
  • Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 47 — Constitution Bench: selection does not create an indefeasible right to appointment; recruitment notifications are invitations to apply.
  • Ranjeet Kumar v. State of Jharkhand, 2012 SCC OnLine Jhar 2102 — Single Judge exposition concurring with S.S. Balu; filling posts is a prerogative power, not a legal obligation to fill every vacancy immediately.
  • State of Orissa v. Raj Kishore Nanda, (2010) 6 SCC 777 — exclusive prerogative of employer to initiate selection; courts cannot compel filling of posts, particularly in view of financial constraints.

Case Title
Devendra Paswan & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors.

Case Number
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 8521 of 2020

Citation(s)
2021(1) PLJR 697

Coram and Names of Judges
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah (Oral Judgment dated 02-02-2021)

Names of Advocates and who they appeared for

  • Mr. Dinu Kumar — for the petitioners
  • Mr. Madhaw Prasad Yadav, Government Pleader 23 with Mr. Sanjay Kumar, Assistant Counsel to GP 23 — for the State (Respondent Nos. 1–3)
  • Mr. Gyan Shankar — for Bihar School Examination Board (Respondent Nos. 4–5)

Link to Judgment
https://patnahighcourt.gov.in/viewjudgment/MTUjODUyMSMyMDIwIzEjTg==-qE1mqB5NOBQ=

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Aditya Kumar

Aditya Kumar is a dedicated and detail-oriented legal intern with a strong academic foundation in law and a growing interest in legal research and writing. He is currently pursuing his legal education with a focus on litigation, policy, and public law. Aditya has interned with reputed law offices and assisted in drafting legal documents, conducting research, and understanding court procedures, particularly in the High Court of Patna. Known for his clarity of thought and commitment to learning, Aditya contributes to Samvida Law Associates by simplifying complex legal topics for public understanding through well-researched blog posts.

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