Simplified Explanation of the Judgment

This judgment of the Patna High Court deals with two connected criminal appeals challenging a 1994 conviction and life sentence for murder (Section 302/34 IPC) and seven years under Section 27 of the Arms Act. The original trial court had convicted three accused in Sessions Case No. 65 of 1993, arising from a 1992 incident at Mohanpur, Begusarai. One co-accused’s appeal later abated due to his death. The present Division Bench—Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mohit Kumar Shah and Hon’ble Justice Smt. Soni Shrivastava—re-examined the entire record and set aside the conviction, extending the benefit of doubt to the appellants. The oral judgment is dated 21 August 2025.

The prosecution case originated from a fardbeyan recorded on the night of 28 August 1992, alleging that the deceased (a village resident returning from duty on a bicycle) was surrounded by multiple persons who opened “indiscriminate” fire near agricultural fields (Balha Bandh area). The prosecution claimed there were two direct eyewitnesses: the informant (son of the deceased) and his brother. Several other villagers were said to have reached on hearing gunshots.

At trial, eleven prosecution witnesses were examined. Among them, two became hostile and several were “formal” witnesses (signatories to seizure/inquest). The two critical witnesses were the informant and his brother, who claimed to have seen the shooting. The defence examined five witnesses and highlighted alleged investigative lapses, inconsistencies in the prosecution narrative, and the absence of reliable physical corroboration.

In appeal, the High Court scrutinised (i) inconsistencies in the eyewitness accounts, (ii) delays and omissions in witness statements under Section 161 CrPC, (iii) contradictions between ocular testimony and medical evidence, and (iv) gaps in basic physical corroboration at the scene.

First, the Court found material omissions regarding the presence of the brother (projected as an eyewitness). His name did not appear in the earliest version (fardbeyan) or the informant’s first police statement. His own Section 161 statement was recorded after an unexplained delay. He also admitted to hiding in the fields on hearing gunshots and to reaching the spot after the assailants fled—facts that undermined the claim that he actually saw the firing. The Court termed these omissions and conduct “vital” and not mere trivialities. When coupled with the Investigating Officer’s testimony that the family did not initially come forward to give statements despite his presence overnight, the Court concluded this witness could not be treated as a true eyewitness.

Second, the Court examined the informant’s testimony. It noted contradictions about where he was when he observed the incident (e.g., whether he was going to or coming from the field), and about the exact positions and movements of the assailants and the deceased. The Court found it difficult to accept that, if the informant stood relatively nearby, the assailants would spare him while executing a targeted attack. Equally, despite affirmations of “indiscriminate” firing by several assailants, there was a lack of basic scene-of-crime markers: no empty cartridges were seized; tyre marks of the bicycle were not noted; and, apart from blood beneath the body in the flank (ditch), no blood was found on the nearby road where shots were allegedly fired. The bicycle—said to bear blood—was not seized or forensically examined.

Third, the medical evidence did not align with the prosecution’s core story. According to the doctor, the injuries indicated shots from the left side, whereas the informant had described a frontal, line-formation firing under “surrounding” conditions. The absence of trajectory analysis and of clarity on the type of weapons further obscured the picture. Where medical evidence renders the ocular version improbable, the Court underscored, it becomes a crucial factor in overall evaluation.

Fourth, on motive, the prosecution suggested long-standing enmity relating to village labour issues and alleged threats. The Court found this motive vague and unsupported by contemporaneous documents (e.g., no station diary/sanha entries about threats), and, given the deceased’s own adversarial history with others, the possibility of alternative perpetrators could not be ruled out.

The Court relied on settled principles: criminal conviction must rest on evidence of “sterling quality.” When eyewitness accounts are shaky, inconsistencies material, and objective/medical evidence does not support the narrative, the benefit of doubt must go to the accused. Here, the case essentially hinged on the informant’s testimony, which the Bench found neither unimpeachable nor sufficiently corroborated. In a careful paragraph-by-paragraph analysis, the Court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Accordingly, the Division Bench set aside the conviction and sentences, acquitted the appellants of all charges, and discharged their bail bonds. The appeals were allowed.

Significance or Implication of the Judgment (For general public or government)

This ruling reiterates a fundamental safeguard in criminal law: a conviction for a grave offence like murder cannot be upheld merely because there is suspicion or a tragic death; the prosecution must establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. For citizens, the case is a reminder that courts will not endorse convictions resting on doubtful eyewitnesses, missing physical markers, or unexplained investigative lapses. For law enforcement, the judgment underlines the importance of meticulous scene-of-crime handling—seizure of empty cartridges, collection and labelling of blood-stained earth, seizure and forensic examination of crucial objects like a bicycle allegedly bearing blood—and prompt, properly documented witness statements. For trial courts, it reinforces the need to cross-verify ocular evidence with medical and objective evidence and to avoid reliance on solitary testimony that is inconsistent or uncorroborated. For the State, it signals that weak motive theories, without contemporaneous records, cannot shore up a fragile case.

Legal Issue(s) Decided and the Court’s Decision with reasoning

• Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants committed murder with common intention (Section 302/34 IPC) and used firearms (Section 27 Arms Act).
  — Decision: No. The Court found material inconsistencies in the eyewitness accounts, delays/omissions in recording statements, and contradictions vis-à-vis medical evidence. The objective scene-of-crime support (cartridges, tyre marks, seizure of bicycle, blood distribution) was lacking. Thus, the standard of “beyond reasonable doubt” was not met.
• Whether the testimony of the informant as a solitary “eyewitness” could sustain the conviction.
  — Decision: No. The informant’s version contained contradictions and lacked reliable corroboration. The brother’s claim as eyewitness was disbelieved due to vital omissions and conduct inconsistent with natural human behaviour post-incident.
• Whether medical evidence supported the ocular description of “frontal, indiscriminate firing while surrounding the deceased.”
  — Decision: No. Injury locations and the doctor’s deposition suggested shots from the left side; there was no satisfactory explanation reconciling this with the asserted manner of attack. Such conflict substantially weakened the prosecution narrative.
• Whether alleged motive (old enmity/ labour disputes) could substitute for proof.
  — Decision: No. Motive alone cannot sustain conviction. The alleged motive was vague, unsupported by records, and could not overcome serious evidentiary gaps.

Judgments Referred by Parties (with citations)

• State of U.P. v. Satish, (2005) 3 SCC 114 — cited to argue that unexplained delays in recording witness statements affect credibility.
• State of Punjab v. Sucha Singh & Ors., (2003) 3 SCC 153 — relied on “unnatural conduct” of a purported eyewitness as a factor undermining reliability.
• Sunil Kundu & Anr. v. State of Jharkhand, (2013) 4 SCC 422 — pressed to emphasise that serious investigative lapses strike at the root of the prosecution case.

Judgments Relied Upon or Cited by Court (with citations)

• State of Uttarakhand v. Darshan Singh, (2020) 12 SCC 605 — principle that when medical evidence makes the ocular version improbable or rules it out, the ocular testimony may be disbelieved.
• Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of M.P., AIR 1952 SC 343 — classic guidance on proof beyond reasonable doubt and the need for evidence of sterling quality.
• State v. Mahender Singh Dahiya, (2011) 3 SCC 109 — standards for evaluating prosecution evidence and benefit of doubt.
• Ramesh Harijan v. State of U.P., (2012) 5 SCC 777 — reiteration that where evidence is not cogent/creditworthy, conviction cannot stand.

Case Title

Appellants v. State of Bihar (Criminal Appeals arising from Sessions Case No. 65 of 1993; names withheld in this post as per editorial policy)

Case Number

Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 208 of 1994 and Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 277 of 1994.

Coram and Names of Judges

Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mohit Kumar Shah; Hon’ble Justice Smt. Soni Shrivastava. Judgment dated 21 August 2025.

Names of Advocates and who they appeared for

• For the appellants: Mr. Ansh Prasad, Adv.; Mr. Shubham Prakash, Adv.; Mr. Rajeev Ranjan, Adv.
• For the State: Ms. Shashi Bala Verma, APP.

Link to Judgment

NSMyMDgjMTk5NCMxI04=-wkA0kk4SMgk=.pdf

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