The Patna High Court, in a judgment dated 12 March 2021, allowed two connected criminal appeals arising from a 2010 Kahalgaon police case and set aside the convictions recorded by the trial court under Sections 366A and 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The case involved allegations that two co-villagers kidnapped a minor girl and that one of them committed rape during the period of confinement. The appeals were heard and decided by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Birendra Kumar.

The background is straightforward. The appellants had been tried in Sessions Trial No. 1054 of 2010/785 of 2011 for offences under Sections 366A and 376 IPC. By the trial court’s judgment dated 31 January 2017 and sentence dated 8 February 2017, both were convicted under Section 366A and sentenced to five years’ rigorous imprisonment with fine; in addition, one appellant was convicted under Section 376 and sentenced to seven years’ rigorous imprisonment with fine, the sentences to run concurrently.

The prosecution version, as narrated in the written report of the victim’s father, was that on 10 February 2010, while he and his wife were away from their village home, the two co-villagers forcibly took away the girl on a motorcycle. Two villagers were said to have witnessed the kidnapping and were threatened when they protested. The First Information Report (FIR) was lodged nine days later, on 19 February 2010. During trial, however, those two eye-witnesses (PW-1 and PW-2) turned hostile; the parents’ testimony was held to be hearsay, and the case effectively rested on the sole testimony of the victim (PW-5). Medical evidence disclosed no signs of violence, no foreign hair, and no spermatozoa on swab; the examination occurred five days after the alleged occurrence, and a separate medical report opined the victim was below 18 years.

The defence examined three witnesses to suggest a motive for false implication—an alleged dispute over wages at NTPC, Barh—and to challenge a supporting claim about a teacher said to be connected with the victim.

In assessing the appeal, the High Court carefully scrutinised the evidentiary record. It flagged critical inconsistencies between the FIR narrative and the victim’s later account. According to the Court, the victim stated that she had been kidnapped on the way to school; her father, however, had reported that she was kidnapped from the house in the presence of villagers. The victim also gave varying accounts of the places where she stayed—from Tulsipur to Mordiha—between 10 and 18 February 2010, mentioning multiple persons in the houses where she was kept, and later described an escape to Kahalgaon Police Station on 19 February 2010, where her statement was not recorded until 20 February 2010.

The Court found that the victim’s conduct—travelling with the appellant to different locations without protest, speaking with household members at Mordiha, and walking with him purportedly to marry—undercut the prosecution’s version of events. These circumstances, coupled with the non-examination of the house inmates at Tulsipur and Mordiha and the unexplained delay in recording the victim’s statement at Kahalgaon Police Station, created serious doubt.

The delay of nine days in lodging the FIR—despite the informant allegedly being told by two witnesses on the very day of the incident—was another factor that weighed against the prosecution. The Court observed that, in the circumstances, the informant should have promptly approached the police; the delay, explained only as a personal search for the victim, raised the possibility of deliberation and concoction.

On the legal standards, the Court reiterated settled law that, while corroboration is not an indispensable requirement in every case of sexual assault, if the prosecutrix’s testimony suffers from material improbabilities or appears to suppress material facts, courts may insist on some corroboration to guard against the possibility of punishing an innocent person. Reference was made to the Supreme Court’s decisions in State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh (1996) 2 SCC 384 and Raju v. State of M.P. (2008) 5 SCC 133, which balance the need to treat the victim’s testimony with respect against the risk of false implication.

The Court also invoked the “sterling witness” test from Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2012) 8 SCC 21, emphasising that before relying solely on the prosecutrix, the Court must be satisfied her version is of very high quality, consistent from inception to deposition, and corroborated by surrounding circumstances. On facts, the Court held that the prosecutrix did not meet this test.

A further deficiency related to age. The prosecution failed to prove the victim’s exact age below the statutory threshold to vitiate consent. Relying on State of M.P. v. Munna @ Shambhu Nath (2016) 1 SCC 696, the Court noted that evidence of approximate age is insufficient to reach a conclusion about exact age. In the absence of clear proof of minority, and given the evidentiary doubts, the conviction could not safely stand.

In the result, both appeals were allowed. The appellants were acquitted; one appellant in custody was ordered to be released forthwith, and the other’s bail bond liability stood terminated.

Significance or Implication of the Judgment

This judgment reiterates key safeguards in trials for sexual offences. While the testimony of a prosecutrix is to be treated with due weight and does not invariably require corroboration, courts must remain vigilant where the narrative contains material inconsistencies, unexplained delays, or omissions in basic investigative steps. The decision underscores three practical points for police and prosecutors in Bihar:

1. Prompt FIR and Recording of Statements: Where family members claim to know of a kidnapping on the day of occurrence, unexplained delays in lodging the FIR may fatally weaken the case. Equally, police must record statements without avoidable delay once the victim approaches the station.
2. Consistency and Corroboration: If the prosecutrix’s account shifts on core aspects such as the place of occurrence, period of confinement, or the presence of others, the court may require corroboration—medical, forensic, or testimonial—to fortify the charge. Here, the absence of injuries or biological traces and the failure to examine house inmates counted heavily.
3. Proof of Age: Where age is pivotal (e.g., Section 366A or consent under Section 376), the prosecution must prove exact age through reliable documents or ossification tests sufficient to demonstrate minority; approximate assertions may not suffice.

For the general public, the ruling clarifies that criminal courts will acquit if reasonable doubt arises from inconsistent testimony or weak investigation. For law-enforcement, it is a reminder to minimise delays, properly examine all relevant witnesses, and gather dependable medical and age-related evidence to sustain serious charges.

Legal Issue(s) Decided and the Court’s Decision with Reasoning

• Whether the conviction under Sections 366A and 376 IPC could be sustained on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix despite inconsistencies and lack of corroboration: The Court held “no.” Given material contradictions between the FIR and the victim’s account, absence of protest during alleged confinement and movement, non-examination of house inmates, and delayed recording of her statement, the Court insisted on corroboration which was lacking.
• Effect of delay in lodging FIR and in recording the victim’s statement: The nine-day delay in filing the FIR and the one-day delay in recording the victim’s statement after she herself reached Kahalgaon P.S. created doubt about possible deliberation and undermined the prosecution’s reliability.
• Standard for acting on sole testimony of the prosecutrix (“sterling witness” test): The Court reiterated Rai Sandeep’s standard and found the prosecutrix did not qualify as a “sterling witness,” given inconsistencies and lack of supportive circumstances.
• Proof of age and consent: The prosecution failed to establish the victim’s exact age below the statutory limit, and on a careful appraisal, the possibility of consent could not be ruled out; in such circumstances, conviction was unsafe.
• Final outcome: Appeals allowed; convictions set aside; one appellant released, the other exonerated from bail-bond liability.

Judgments Referred by Parties (with citations)

• Santosh Prasad @ Santosh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2020) 3 SCC 443 — relied upon by appellants to argue against sustaining conviction on sole, unreliable testimony without corroboration.

Judgments Relied Upon or Cited by Court (with citations)

• State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 — on appreciation of prosecutrix’s testimony and when corroboration may be looked for.
• Raju v. State of M.P., (2008) 5 SCC 133 — balancing the need to protect victims with the risk of false implication.
• Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 21 — “sterling witness” test reiterated in para 22.
• State of M.P. v. Munna @ Shambhu Nath, (2016) 1 SCC 696 — approximate age evidence insufficient to establish exact age.

Case Title
Sekh Magan @ Md. S.K. Magan & Anr. v. State of Bihar

Case Number
Criminal Appeal (SJ) No. 912 of 2017 with Criminal Appeal (SJ) No. 1051 of 2017

Citation(s)
2021(2) PLJR 421

Coram and Names of Judges
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Birendra Kumar (Judgment dated 12-03-2021)

Names of Advocates and who they appeared for

• For the appellant (in Cr. App. (SJ) No. 912 of 2017): Mr. Rajive Ranjan Singh, Advocate
• For the State (APP): Smt. Abha Singh
• For the appellant (in Cr. App. (SJ) No. 1051 of 2017): Mr. Jyoti Ranjan Jha, Advocate
• For the State (APP): Mr. Abhay Kumar

Link to Judgment
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