India is a vast and diverse country, and no single authority can manage everything on its own. That’s why our Constitution created a system where power is shared between the central government and the state governments. This setup is called federalism, and it plays a big role in how our country is run every day. This article explains how this power-sharing system works in simple terms. It shows how the central government in Delhi takes care of national issues like defense and foreign affairs, while state governments handle local matters like schools, hospitals, police, and roads. Some areas like the environment, health, and education are shared by both.
But what happens when the Centre and states don’t agree? The article also looks at real examples of these tensions and how the Constitution tries to balance them. Sometimes, central control increases, which can upset states. At other times, states demand more freedom to make their own decisions.
The goal of this system is to keep the country united while still allowing states to protect their unique languages, cultures, and needs. Understanding this balance helps us see how decisions affect our daily lives and why cooperation between all levels of government really matters
India’s constitutional system is a unique attempt to reconcile a strong Centre with a resilient federal framework. This duality reflects the vision of “unity in diversity” championed by the framers of the Constitution. Since the post-liberalisation era, however, the evolving political landscape—marked by coalition governments, assertive regional parties, and economic decentralisation—has continuously tested this delicate balance.
Institutional tensions between the Centre and States over policy formulation, financial distribution, and administrative autonomy have sharpened. The judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, has played a pivotal role in interpreting constitutional provisions—sometimes consolidating central authority, other times upholding federal values. Recent trends toward centralised policymaking and the alleged misuse of investigative agencies against opposition-led States have raised concerns over the erosion of federal principles. Nonetheless, Indian federalism remains dynamic, constantly responding to socio-political change while striving to uphold its constitutional spirit of cooperative governance.
I. Federal Constitution and Central Bias
India’s Constitution, which came into effect in 1950, proclaims India as a “Union of States.” Unlike the classic federal model seen in countries like the United States, India follows a quasi-federal structure where power is shared between the Centre and the States—albeit with a pronounced bias toward the Union government. This bias was a deliberate choice by the Constituent Assembly to ensure national unity and integrity in a regionally and culturally diverse country.
However, this foundational centrality increasingly comes into tension with the rise of regional political assertiveness. As a result, Indian federalism is not a fixed institutional structure but a constantly contested space where competing ideas of governance unfold.
II. Constitutional Foundations of Indian Federalism
The distribution of powers is enshrined in the Seventh Schedule, which delineates three lists:
- Union List: National matters like defence, foreign affairs, atomic energy.
- State List: Areas such as police, public health, and agriculture.
- Concurrent List: Shared subjects, such as education and criminal law.
Even within the Concurrent List, the Union law prevails in case of conflict (Article 254). The Centre also holds overriding power in cases of “national interest” or emergencies. Additionally, Article 356 (President’s Rule) enables the suspension of State autonomy—historically overused to destabilise elected State governments.
III. The Political Economy of Centralisation
Over time, the Centre has leveraged its fiscal and legislative powers to increase its influence. Revenue collection is primarily centralised—through GST, income tax, excise duties—while States remain dependent on transfers. The 15th Finance Commission noted this vertical fiscal imbalance, highlighting the Centre’s disproportionate revenue share.
The introduction of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) in 2017, though a landmark reform, consolidated central control. The GST Council—intended as a federal body—has often been criticised for prioritising central interests and stifling dissent, especially during the COVID-19 compensation crisis.
IV. Federalism in Crisis: Centre vs States
The COVID-19 pandemic exposed the fragility of India’s federal structure. States like Kerala and Maharashtra opposed the Centre’s top-down imposition of lockdowns, vaccine procurement protocols, and relief distribution. Even the Supreme Court remarked that the Centre should not function as a “granary,” unilaterally determining the flow of funds.
Similarly, the controversial Farm Laws (2020), enacted without adequate State consultation, sparked widespread protests and were eventually repealed. Given that agriculture is a State subject, the episode highlighted the friction between federal autonomy and central policymaking.
V. Judicial Calibration of Federalism
The judiciary has played a dual role—sometimes guarding federal principles and at other times enabling central overreach. In S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, the Supreme Court established strict conditions for invoking Article 356, thus protecting democratic federalism.
In Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India (2023), the Court upheld the Delhi government’s control over administrative services. However, the Centre subsequently issued an ordinance to override the judgment, highlighting the tenuous nature of judicial victories for federalism.
VI. Missing Inter-Governmental Mechanisms
The decline of institutions designed to facilitate Centre-State dialogue is a pressing concern. The Inter-State Council and Zonal Councils have become largely dormant. The Planning Commission, once a forum for cooperative engagement, was replaced by NITI Aayog, whose advisory role lacks institutional weight.
In the absence of formal dialogue mechanisms, policymaking risks becoming unilateral, weakening the spirit of cooperative federalism. Calls for a Federal Institution Tribunal, as recommended in various Law Commission reports, remain unaddressed.
VII. Emerging Fault Lines: Language, Culture, and Identity
Federal tensions are not limited to fiscal or legislative domains—they extend to cultural and linguistic identity. Recent pushes to promote Hindi as a national language and proposals to rename India as “Bharat” have alarmed regional parties, especially in linguistically distinct states like Tamil Nadu.
Such moves are seen as attempts to centralise national identity, undermining the cultural sovereignty of States. These debates reinforce that federalism in India is as much about political representation and cultural autonomy as it is about administrative governance.
VIII. Conclusion: Reimagining Federalism in the 21st Century
Indian federalism today stands at a crossroads. What is needed is not merely administrative decentralisation but genuine cooperative federalism—where States are equal stakeholders in governance, not passive recipients of central directives.
The current paradox is stark: while States are politically assertive, institutional mechanisms for negotiation and power-sharing have weakened. The constitutional framework alone cannot sustain this balance. It must be reinforced through:
- Revitalised inter-governmental dialogue (e.g., active Inter-State Councils)
- Equitable fiscal distribution
- Judicial rectitude to check executive overreach
- Political commitment to pluralism and inclusivity
Ultimately, reimagining Indian federalism is not just about redistributing power—it is about building trust, enabling democratic co-governance, and reaffirming the pluralist values that lie at the heart of the Indian republic.
About the authors
Aditya Kumar
3rd Year Student at Chanakya National Law University, Patna
Samriddhi Priya
3rd Year Student at Chanakya National Law University, Patna
