The Patna High Court, in a writ decision dated 24-02-2021, clarified that a candidate who receives an appointment letter must join within the stipulated time—extendable by at most one month under Bihar government rules. A joining attempt made after more than three years cannot be accepted. The Court dismissed the writ petition filed by an aspirant for the post of Fireman who sought directions to accept his delayed joining and to quash the rejection memo.

In this case, the petitioner had successfully cleared a recruitment cycle for Fireman advertised under Advertisement No. 02/2012. Following written, screening and physical efficiency tests, and a medical fitness test, an appointment letter was issued on 16.07.2015 with a clear instruction to report at the Fire Training Institute, Bihta, by 17.07.2015. The petitioner did not join within time, citing ill health, and approached the authorities only in November 2018. The competent authority rejected the request by memo dated 07.02.2019, relying on Clause 3(15) of the Personnel & Administrative Reforms Department Resolution dated 16.07.2007, which permits, at best, an extension of one month for joining.

The High Court upheld the rejection, emphasising that permitting joining after such an inordinate delay would create administrative confusion, cause public inconvenience, and result in new injustices to third parties. The Court reiterated the settled principle that litigants must pursue their rights diligently and cannot sleep over them for an unduly long period. On these facts, the Court declined to exercise its extraordinary and discretionary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed.

Significance or Implication of the Judgment (For general public or government)

This decision is an important reminder for both candidates and departments in Bihar:

• For candidates, especially those selected for uniformed and disciplined services, the judgment underscores that the timeline in the appointment letter is not a formality. Unless a valid extension is sought and granted within the prescribed limit, an appointment can lapse. Seeking acceptance of joining after several years—on grounds such as illness without contemporaneous communication or proof of timely request—will likely fail.
• For government departments and recruiting bodies, the judgment supports consistent enforcement of joining timelines set out in policy. It prevents administrative anomalies, avoids disruption to training schedules, and maintains fairness for other selected candidates who complied with timelines or those on waiting lists.
• For the public at large, the decision ensures that recruitment processes remain predictable and free of ad hoc relaxations that could open the door to unequal treatment. The Court expressly noted that allowing extremely belated joining would encourage indiscipline and create inequality vis-à-vis similarly situated appointees who followed the rules.

Simplified Explanation of the Judgment (700–900 words using plain legal English)

The case concerns a Fireman recruitment conducted in Bihar through Advertisement No. 02/2012. The petitioner, who belonged to the OBC category, took part in the written examination on 15.12.2013 and cleared it when results were declared on 15.04.2014. He also cleared the screening and physical efficiency tests held between 23.05.2014 and 29.05.2014 at Patna High School, Gardanibagh. Eventually, he was listed among 951 selected candidates. He was called for document verification and medical testing; he passed the medical examination and received an appointment letter dated 16.07.2015. The letter required him to report for joining by 17.07.2015 at the Fire Training Institute, Anandpur, Bihta (Patna).

The petitioner did not join by the last date. He claimed he was unwell and remained ill until the end of 2018. Only thereafter, on 02.11.2018, he submitted a request to the State Fire Officer to accept his joining. The authority rejected this request through memo no. 648 dated 07.02.2019, stating that the delay was approximately 3 years, 3 months, and 15 days and that such a delay cannot be condoned under the governing policy—Clause 3(15) of the Resolution dated 16.07.2007 of the Personnel and Administrative Reforms Department.

The petitioner came to the High Court, asking for two main reliefs: (1) quashing the rejection memo, and (2) a direction to accept his joining on the post of Fireman. His counsel argued that the delay happened because of illness and requested a “sympathetic” or “equitable” view, considering that the petitioner had already been selected and issued an appointment letter.

The State opposed the petition. It pointed out that the appointment letter fixed a joining date of 17.07.2015, and even if an extension were possible, the relevant resolution allows a maximum extension of one month only. By that measure, the latest permissible date would have been around 17.08.2015. A request made in November 2018 is far beyond the permissible window. Therefore, the rejection was lawful.

The Court analysed Clause 3(15) of the 16.07.2007 Resolution. In substance, the clause provides that after selection, the competent appointing authority may grant, at most, one month’s time for joining. If a candidate does not join within that time, the appointment does not survive. The Court noted that the petitioner not only failed to join within the stipulated time but also failed to approach the authorities promptly for any extension. In fact, there was nothing preventing him from writing to the department immediately in 2015 seeking an extension supported by medical documents; however, he waited for more than three years.

The Court then discussed the consequences of allowing joining after such a long period. First, it would disrupt the administrative process—training schedules, batch allocations, and manpower planning that had already been finalised years earlier. Second, it would cause “public inconvenience” and “new injustices,” especially to other candidates who either joined on time or those who were placed on waiting lists and perhaps later considered. Third, it would reward delay (legal laches), which courts discourage, particularly in public employment where discipline and certainty are crucial.

In writ jurisdiction under Article 226, courts have broad but discretionary power. That discretion is guided by fairness, legality, and public interest. Here, the Court found that interference would be unjustified, as the petitioner slept over his rights for an unreasonably long time without taking the minimum step of seeking a timely extension. The Court also observed that granting relief would encourage indiscipline and create inequality/discrimination vis-à-vis similarly placed appointees who complied with the joining conditions. On these grounds, the Court refused relief and dismissed the writ petition.

In simple terms, the judgment tells candidates: “If you are appointed, join within the time given. If you genuinely cannot, ask for an extension straightaway—because the rules allow only a short extension. If you wait for years, the opportunity will be treated as lost.” It also assures departments that strictly following their recruitment timelines, as per policy, will be supported by the Court.

Legal Issue(s) Decided and the Court’s Decision with reasoning (Use bullet points)

• Whether an appointee can demand acceptance of joining after several years from the date stipulated in the appointment letter.
  — Decision: No. Under Clause 3(15) of the 16.07.2007 Resolution, only a one-month extension can be granted for joining. A delay of more than three years is inordinate and cannot be condoned.
• Whether illness, without timely communication and request for extension, justifies acceptance of belated joining.
  — Decision: No. The petitioner did not seek an extension contemporaneously. Courts discourage laches; relief in writ jurisdiction is discretionary and was declined in public interest.
• Whether allowing such belated joining would adversely affect administration and third parties.
  — Decision: Yes. It would cause confusion, public inconvenience, and injustice to others, and encourage indiscipline and inequality among similarly situated candidates.

Judgments Referred by Parties (with citations) — Skip if none.

Judgments Relied Upon or Cited by Court (with citations) — Skip if none.

Case Title
Babool Kumar v. The State of Bihar & Ors.

Case Number
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 9862 of 2019

Citation(s)
2021(2) PLJR 390

Coram and Names of Judges — Always prefix with Hon’ble
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mohit Kumar Shah (Oral Judgment dated 24-02-2021)

Names of Advocates and who they appeared for

• For the petitioner: Mr. Pramod Kumar Singh, Advocate
• For the State (Respondent): Mr. Saroj Sharma, AC to AAG-3
• For the Central Selection Board (Constable Recruitment): Mr. Sanjay Pandey, Advocate; Mr. Binod Kumar Mishra, Advocate; Mr. Vivek Anand Amritesh, Advocate

Link to Judgment
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