The Patna High Court has reaffirmed important safeguards in disciplinary inquiries against government servants—particularly police officers—by dismissing a Letters Patent Appeal filed by the State and upholding a Single Judge’s order that had set aside a major punishment imposed on a Deputy Superintendent of Police (then posted as SDPO, Hilsa). The Division Bench comprising Hon’ble the Acting Chief Justice and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Partha Sarthy delivered the oral judgment on 30 January 2025, confirming restoration of service benefits as directed by the Single Judge.
The controversy began with a 2019 kidnapping case (Nagarnausa P.S. Case No. 77/2019). In his role as supervising officer, the SDPO directed arrests of the principal accused’s family members. A subsequent supervision report by the Superintendent of Police, Nalanda expressed that only one arrestee was truly required to be proceeded against. This triggered a departmental proceeding against the SDPO, leading to his suspension and the eventual order imposing (i) withholding of three increments with cumulative effect, and (ii) withholding of promotion for three years.
During inquiry, core procedural lapses occurred. On 19 March 2020, the SP, Nalanda was examined; the Department’s Presenting Officer remained absent, and the Inquiry Officer himself effectively presented the Department’s case. The SDPO’s prepared questions for cross-examination were not allowed, denying him a fair chance to test the SP’s testimony. The Single Judge later found clear violation of Rule 17(11) and Rule 17(14) of the Bihar Government Servants (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 2005.
The Single Judge set aside the punishment and the rejection of review, ordering reinstatement with all consequential financial benefits. The State appealed. The Division Bench meticulously reviewed whether the inquiry had observed the prescribed procedure and principles of natural justice, rather than re-appreciating evidence anew—consistent with established limits on judicial review of departmental findings under Article 226.
Notably, the Bench recorded that the SDPO had, in fact, visited the place of occurrence with the SHO and that the Investigating Officer was then in Chennai, effecting arrests on the SDPO’s instructions—facts that undercut the charges that he had not visited the scene or had misrepresented the situation. The alleged “delay” of about 16 days in writing the supervision note was also viewed as a minor infraction connected to the pace of investigation, not serious misconduct attracting a major penalty.
The Bench emphasized that arresting the near relatives of the main accused—who, without their connivance, could not have facilitated the offence—was a considered supervisory decision that led to recovery of the minor victim. Treating this as misconduct was impermissible.
On legal principles, the Court drew guidance from (i) State of U.P. v. Saroj Kumar Sinha (2010) 2 SCC 772 on the impropriety of the Inquiry Officer acting as Presenting Officer, (ii) Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran (2015) 2 SCC 610 delineating the High Court’s scope under Article 226, and (iii) Inspector Prem Chand v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi (2007) 4 SCC 566 read with Union of India v. J. Ahmed (1979) 2 SCC 286 clarifying that mere negligence, error of judgment, or innocent mistake does not amount to “misconduct” absent ill-motive.
Reinforcing the Single Judge’s conclusions, the Division Bench held the charges “flimsy” and unsubstantiated, approved the quashing of the punishment and review rejection, and dismissed the appeal.
Simplified Explanation of the Judgment
This case concerns the limits of disciplinary action in the police force and the procedural fairness required in departmental inquiries. A Deputy Superintendent of Police (the “respondent”) faced major punishment—stoppage of three increments with cumulative effect and denial of promotion for three years—arising from his supervision of a 2019 kidnapping investigation. The Single Judge quashed the punishment, finding serious procedural violations during the inquiry and holding that the charges themselves were weak. The State appealed; the Division Bench of the Patna High Court has now dismissed that appeal.
First, the facts. The officer, as Sub-Divisional Police Officer, oversaw a kidnapping case in which he directed the arrest of the main accused’s relatives. Later, a superior officer’s supervision report suggested that only one arrestee merited action and criticized the arrests of the others. Based on this, a departmental proceeding was initiated; the officer was suspended and served with charges. He replied point-wise. On the hearing date, the Department’s Presenting Officer was absent; the Inquiry Officer himself advanced the Department’s case. The officer’s prepared cross-examination of the SP, Nalanda was not permitted—an important denial of fair hearing. These facts were central to the Single Judge’s finding that Rule 17(11) and Rule 17(14) of the Bihar CCA Rules, 2005 were “blatantly violated.”
Second, the legal yardstick. The High Court does not act as a “second court of first appeal” in departmental matters; it does not re-weigh evidence. However, it must ensure that (a) a competent authority conducted the inquiry, (b) procedure prescribed by rules was followed, and (c) principles of natural justice were respected. Where findings are influenced by irrelevant considerations or lack evidence, intervention is justified.
Third, the nature of “misconduct.” The Division Bench reaffirmed that negligence, error of judgment, or an innocent mistake—without ill-motive—does not amount to misconduct. This principle, drawn from Supreme Court authority (Inspector Prem Chand; J. Ahmed), was directly applied. Here, the officer’s description of visiting the place of occurrence with the SHO (and mistakenly writing “IO”) was treated as a minor, venial error. The 16-day delay in the supervision note was viewed as linked to the pace of investigation, not as an independently culpable lapse.
Fourth, the outcome of the supervised investigation supports the officer’s judgment. The arrests—particularly of the main accused’s parents—contributed to recovery of the minor victim. The Court reasoned that such supervisory directions fell within the officer’s discretion and should not, without more, form the basis of a major penalty.
Fifth, the procedural vice proved fatal. The Department’s Presenting Officer’s absence, the Inquiry Officer stepping into that role, and the denial of cross-examination undermined the integrity of the inquiry. The Single Judge relied on State of U.P. v. Saroj Kumar Sinha to denounce the Inquiry Officer acting as Presenting Officer. The Division Bench endorsed that approach, also invoking Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran to explain the careful yet limited scope of judicial review in such matters.
In the end, the Bench agreed that the charges were “flimsy” and unsubstantiated; even if assumed “proved,” they would not legally constitute misconduct warranting punishment. It therefore affirmed the Single Judge’s directions restoring the officer with consequential benefits and dismissed the State’s appeal.
Why this matters: For civil servants—especially police personnel—the judgment underscores that serious penalties must be anchored in real misconduct proven through a fair, rule-compliant inquiry. Supervisory decisions taken in good faith during fast-moving investigations cannot be retrofitted into “misconduct” merely because a later officer takes a different view. The Court’s analysis protects investigation-related discretion while insisting on procedural fairness.
Significance or Implication of the Judgment (For general public or government)
- Reinforcing procedural fairness: Government departments must ensure that inquiry officers do not double up as presenting officers and that delinquent officials receive full opportunities, including cross-examination. This is essential not only to comply with Rules 17(11) and 17(14) of the Bihar CCA Rules, 2005 but also to uphold natural justice.
- Clarifying “misconduct”: The decision reiterates that mere negligence or a venial error, absent mala fides, is not misconduct. This distinction protects honest decision-making in the field, particularly in policing where rapid judgment calls are routine.
- Limiting punitive action based on hindsight: Supervisory choices that led to effective investigation (here, recovery of a minor) should not be penalized simply because a later review prefers a narrower approach. This reduces the chilling effect on proactive policing.
- Judicial review boundaries reaffirmed: High Courts will not re-weigh evidence but will intervene when rules are violated or findings are unsupported or arbitrary. Departments must therefore conduct inquiries with scrupulous regard to procedure.
Legal Issue(s) Decided and the Court’s Decision (with reasoning)
- Whether the departmental inquiry complied with Rule 17(11) & 17(14) of the Bihar CCA Rules, 2005 and principles of natural justice
• Decision: No. The Inquiry Officer’s acting as Presenting Officer and denial of cross-examination violated the Rules and fair hearing. - Whether the proved charges legally constituted “misconduct” warranting major punishment
• Decision: No. The charges were “flimsy.” A mistaken reference to “IO,” a 16-day delay in drafting a supervision note, and arrest of close relatives—leading to recovery—do not amount to misconduct absent ill-motive. - Scope of judicial review in departmental proceedings under Article 226
• Decision: The Court may intervene where inquiry is procedurally defective, influenced by irrelevant considerations, or unsupported by evidence, without re-appreciating evidence like an appellate court. - Final relief
• Decision: Appeal dismissed; Single Judge’s order quashing punishment and rejecting the review stands affirmed; restoration with financial and consequential benefits remains.
Judgments Referred by Parties
- State of U.P. v. Saroj Kumar Sinha, (2010) 2 SCC 772.
Judgments Relied Upon or Cited by Court
- Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 — on the limits of judicial review.
- Inspector Prem Chand v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, (2007) 4 SCC 566 — defining misconduct in service law.
- Union of India v. J. Ahmed, (1979) 2 SCC 286 — negligence/error of judgment is not misconduct absent ill-motive.
Case Title
The State of Bihar & Ors. v. Md. Muttafique Ahmad,
Case Number
Letters Patent Appeal No. 900 of 2024 (arising out of C.W.J.C. No. 5640 of 2021).
Citation(s)
2025 (1) PLJR 748
Coram and Names of Judges
Hon’ble the Acting Chief Justice and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Partha Sarthy. (Judgment dated 30-01-2025).
Names of Advocates and who they appeared for
- For the appellants (State): Mr. P.K. Shahi, Advocate General; Mr. Nadim Seraj, Government Pleader-5.
- For the respondent (aggrieved officer): Mr. Abhinav Srivastava, Senior Advocate; Mr. Shubham Priyadarshi, Advocate; Mr. Pushkar Bharadwaj, Advocate; Ms. Shreyanshi Raj, Advocate.
Link to Judgment
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