Case Background
The criminal case began with a written report lodged on 21.08.2015 at Vaishali Police Station by the mother of the girl, who deposed as PW-6. She belongs to a Scheduled Caste community and lived at Rahimpur village. A mosque stood in front of her house, where the appellant worked as a Maulana.
According to the FIR, there was an existing dispute between the informant and two other villagers, namely the local Dafadar and another man, about placing a small shop (gumti) at a particular spot. On 20.08.2015, the informant’s daughter, referred to as AB in the High Court judgment to protect her identity, went to school and did not return home.
After making inquiries, the informant claimed to have learnt that AB had been kidnapped by the Dafadar and the other villager. She alleged that they acted under a conspiracy to get AB married to the appellant and took her to the appellant’s residence at Muzaffarpur. She also alleged that AB, who belonged to a Mahadalit caste, was specifically targeted for this purpose.
The written report further stated that AB had been recovered from the appellant’s house and that the appellant had sexually assaulted her. On this basis, Vaishali P.S. Case No. 261 of 2015 was registered under Sections 363, 366A, 376, 120B of the Indian Penal Code, Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act), and Section 3(i)(xii) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
AB’s statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was recorded on 22.08.2015 by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Vaishali. She described the alleged occurrence in detail. She said that after school, when she came out to catch an auto-rickshaw, she found the appellant waiting with a motorcycle. He offered to drop her home, but instead took her to Muzaffarpur, locked her in a room and raped her in the night.
AB stated that after receiving a phone call, the appellant locked her from outside and went back to Rahimpur. She claimed that she escaped through a window opening, reached Muzaffarpur town, called her family, and was taken back by her brother. She also said that the appellant had assured her of marriage, but at Muzaffarpur he disclosed that he was already married.
On 24.08.2015, AB was medically examined. A radiologist assessed her age and a lady doctor examined her for sexual assault. The radiologist’s report noted her age as 17 years and found signs of sexual intercourse. The vaginal swab sent to a pathologist showed non-motile spermatozoa.
The police submitted charge-sheet only against the appellant on 31.08.2015, keeping investigation pending against the two other persons named in the FIR.
The 1st Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, POCSO Act, Vaishali, Hajipur took cognizance on 01.02.2016. Charges were framed against the appellant under Sections 376(2)(i), 363, 366A of the IPC, Sections 4, 6, 8, 10 of the POCSO Act and Section 3(i)(xii) of the SC/ST Act. The appellant denied the charges and faced trial.
The trial court examined 11 prosecution witnesses including the Investigating Officer (PW-10), radiologist (PW-11), lady doctor (PW-7), the informant (PW-6), and AB (PW-5). Several documents, including AB’s Section 164 CrPC statement, medical reports, FIR and requisitions, were exhibited.
The defence examined two witnesses as DW-1 and DW-2. After trial, the Special Judge acquitted the appellant of offences under Sections 363, 366A IPC and Section 3(i)(xii) of the SC/ST Act but convicted him under Section 376(2)(i) IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. He was sentenced to 12 years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 50,000, with six months’ simple imprisonment in default.
The appellant filed Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 1031 of 2019 before the Patna High Court challenging this conviction and sentence.
What the Court Examined and Decided
The Division Bench of the Patna High Court, comprising Hon’ble Mr. Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Khatim Reza, heard the appeal and delivered the oral judgment on 10.10.2022.
On behalf of the appellant, learned Senior Counsel argued that the conviction rested mainly on AB’s testimony and the assumption that she was a minor. It was submitted that this assumption was contrary to medical evidence.
The radiologist, whose report initially mentioned AB’s age as 17 years, had in his cross-examination clarified that, based on that very report, her age could be between 18 and 19 years. Counsel argued that this created reasonable doubt about AB being a minor at the time of the incident on 21.08.2015.
Since minority is an essential element for applying both Section 376(2)(i) IPC (as it then stood, dealing with rape on a woman under 16 years of age) and the POCSO Act (which applies to “children” below 18 years), the defence contended that failure to prove age beyond reasonable doubt was fatal to the prosecution.
It was further argued that the background of a dispute over placing a gumti near the mosque, as mentioned in the FIR itself, showed motive for false implication. The defence highlighted contradictions between AB’s statement under Section 164 CrPC and her examination at trial, particularly regarding the mode of transportation and how she was taken to Muzaffarpur.
Attention was also drawn to the Investigating Officer’s evidence. Though the FIR alleged that AB was recovered from the appellant’s house, the IO admitted in cross-examination that AB was recovered from her own house at Rahimpur on 21.08.2015. He also admitted that he had not visited the alleged place of rape at Muzaffarpur.
The defence further pointed out that the appellant was arrested the very next day, yet no medical examination of the appellant was conducted and the victim’s clothes were not sent for forensic testing. In such circumstances, condemning a person for an offence of sexual assault, it was argued, would be unjust without clinching evidence and a truthful, consistent testimony from the victim.
The Additional Public Prosecutor for the State relied on Supreme Court decisions which state that the testimony of a rape victim, in the Indian context, should be treated with great weight and can by itself be sufficient for conviction. She argued that the prosecution had proved that AB was a minor and that the oral testimony of AB, backed by medical findings of sexual intercourse, supported the trial court’s decision.
The High Court began by noting that the trial court itself had disbelieved the prosecution story of kidnapping in a Bolero vehicle and had acquitted the appellant of offences under Sections 363 and 366A IPC. This was based on manifest inconsistencies in AB’s version regarding the vehicle used and circumstances of her alleged abduction.
The central question before the High Court then was whether the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that AB was a minor so as to attract Section 376(2)(i) IPC and the POCSO provisions.
On Section 376(2)(i) IPC, the Bench noted that this provision, as it then existed, required proof that the woman was under 16 years of age. The only evidence on age came from the radiologist. While his report mentioned 17 years, his oral testimony clarified that AB’s age could be between 18 and 19 years. No school record, birth certificate or any other proof of age was produced.
On this basis, the Court held that it could not be reasonably concluded that AB was less than 16 years old on the date of occurrence. Therefore, the essential ingredient of Section 376(2)(i) was not made out, and the conviction under this section could not stand.
Turning to the POCSO Act, the Court stressed that to treat AB as a “child” under Section 2(d), the prosecution had to prove that she was below 18. Again, only the radiological assessment was available, and the same doctor had acknowledged the possible age range of 18–19 years. The High Court concluded that the prosecution failed to conclusively prove that AB was a child or minor on the relevant date. Consequently, conviction under Sections 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act was also unsustainable.
The Bench then examined the broader evidentiary picture, given the seriousness of the allegations. It noted that the FIR claimed AB was recovered from the appellant’s house at Muzaffarpur, whereas AB herself, in her Section 164 statement, claimed she had escaped from a room at Muzaffarpur and then contacted her family. The IO’s deposition, however, stated that AB was recovered at Muzaffarpur and later, in cross-examination, that she was recovered from her house at Rahimpur on 21.08.2015.
The Court observed that the IO had not even visited the alleged place of rape at Muzaffarpur, nor attempted to locate the room where AB claimed to have been confined. This investigative lapse weakened the prosecution case.
At the trial, for the first time, AB deposed that all three accused – the appellant and the two others – were waiting outside her school with a Bolero vehicle, kidnapped her in that Bolero, and that all three raped her. This was a significant departure from her earlier Section 164 statement, where she had spoken only of the appellant taking her on a motorcycle after enticing her with a promise of marriage.
Two witnesses, PW-2 and PW-3, were declared hostile. The informant (PW-6) stated that AB went missing for about 12 hours and that AB later told her about being kidnapped in a Bolero. On cumulative assessment, the High Court found the prosecution evidence “full of inconsistencies and contradictions”.
The Bench held that AB’s testimony, due to these contradictions, was not trustworthy enough to base a conviction on, especially when the foundational fact of her minority was itself doubtful.
The Court also stressed the importance of proper medical and forensic steps in such serious cases. It highlighted that although non-motile spermatozoa were found in AB’s vaginal swab, the appellant was neither medically examined nor were AB’s clothes sent for forensic analysis. Without such crucial linkage, the presence of spermatozoa could not, by itself, prove that the appellant had sexual intercourse with AB.
To underline this point, the Bench referred to the Supreme Court judgment in Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana, (2011) 7 SCC 130. In that case, the Supreme Court held that failure to send semen-stained material for forensic analysis, which could have conclusively tied the accused to the offence, amounted to a fatal lacuna favouring the accused.
The High Court acknowledged the general legal principle that the sole testimony of a rape victim, if reliable, can be sufficient for conviction and need not always be corroborated by medical evidence. However, in this case, given the lack of proof of minority, the inconsistencies in AB’s account, and serious shortcomings in investigation and forensic support, the Court found it unsafe to uphold the conviction.
Ultimately, the Patna High Court held that the conviction of the appellant under Section 376(2)(i) IPC and Sections 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act could not be sustained. It set aside the trial court’s judgment dated 02.07.2019/10.07.2019 and acquitted the appellant of these charges.
As the appellant was in jail serving his sentence, the Court directed that he be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.
Why This Judgment Matters
This judgment is important for both victims and accused persons in sexual offence cases in Bihar and beyond. It shows that even in highly sensitive cases under POCSO and rape laws, courts still apply the basic rule that guilt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
For complainants and their families, it underlines the need to provide consistent statements and proper proof of age where POCSO and age-based IPC sections are involved. School records, birth certificates or other reliable documents become critical.
For the police and prosecution, the decision is a reminder that investigation cannot stop at recording statements. Visiting the place of occurrence, conducting timely medical examination of the accused, and sending clothes or biological samples for forensic analysis are essential steps. If these are skipped, courts may not be able to uphold convictions, even in serious allegations.
For accused persons, the judgment affirms that they cannot be convicted solely on the basis of a doubtful or inconsistent testimony, especially where key statutory conditions like the age of the victim are not firmly proved.
Overall, the Patna High Court reinforces that POCSO and rape trials must be thorough and evidence-based, not driven only by allegation or suspicion.
Legal Issues and Answers
- Issue: Did the prosecution prove that the girl was below 16 years of age on the date of occurrence so as to attract Section 376(2)(i) IPC as it then stood?
Answer: No. The only age evidence was the radiologist’s report and testimony, which left open an age range of 18–19 years, creating reasonable doubt. Conviction under Section 376(2)(i) IPC was therefore set aside. - Issue: Did the prosecution establish that the girl was a “child” (below 18 years) for the purposes of the POCSO Act?
Answer: No. With no documentary age proof and the medical expert indicating a possible age of 18–19 years, the Court held that minority was not conclusively proved. Conviction under Sections 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act could not be maintained. - Issue: Was the remaining evidence, particularly the girl’s testimony and medical findings, sufficient on its own to sustain conviction for sexual assault?
Answer: No. The Court found major inconsistencies in her statements about kidnapping and the role of the accused, and noted investigative lapses such as absence of medical examination of the appellant and lack of forensic testing. Her uncorroborated and inconsistent testimony was held insufficient to uphold conviction.
Cases Cited by the Court
- Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana, (2011) 7 SCC 130.
Case Details
Case Number: Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 1031 of 2019, arising out of Vaishali P.S. Case No. 261 of 2015, G.R. No. 4272 of 2015.
Case Title: Md. Islam v. The State of Bihar.
Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Khatim Reza.
Citation: 2022 (4) PLJR 486.
Advocates: For the appellant – Mr. Girish Chandra Jha (before noting of hearing, the judgment records submissions by learned Senior Counsel Mr. Vindhya Keshri Kumar); For the State – Mr. Satya Narayan Prasad (recorded appearance), with submissions by Ms. Shashi Bala Verma, Additional Public Prosecutor.
Nature of Case: Criminal appeal (Division Bench) against conviction and sentence under Section 376(2)(i) IPC and Sections 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act, arising from a trial conducted by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, POCSO Act, Vaishali, Hajipur.
Date of High Court Judgment: 10.10.2022.
Outcome: Appeal allowed; conviction and sentence set aside; appellant acquitted and directed to be released if not required in any other case.
Link to Judgment: Click here to read the full Patna High Court judgment
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