Case Background
The case began with a written report lodged by the informant, P.W. 10 Yogendra Prasad Gupta, on 27.09.2003 at 01:15 PM at Nauhatta Police Station. The report concerned his nephew, a boy named Shrawan Prasad Gupta, son of Ganga Prasad Gupta of village Rasalpur.
The informant stated that the child lived with him at Shahpur and studied in class 2 at Raman Coaching Centre. On 26.09.2003 at about 05:30 AM, the boy went out of the house to attend the call of nature but did not return. The informant, who ran a grocery shop, was informed by his wife around 07:00 AM that the boy had not come back.
He searched for the child on the Koshi embankment but could not find him. He then went to Mahendra Gupta of Shahpur, uncle of the appellant, and asked about the boy. Mahendra Gupta denied having seen the child. The informant also asked whether Rajesh, described as his “Bhagin Damad” (husband of his sister’s daughter), had come there, and was told that Rajesh had arrived the previous night.
According to the informant, relations between the family of the appellant and his sister and brother‑in‑law had not been good. On 24.09.2003, the appellant and his father had gone to Rasalpur for the “Bidai” of the informant’s niece, but the girl’s father refused. In the alleged altercation, the appellant and his father are said to have threatened to kill the boy.
The informant claimed that at about 4 PM on 26.09.2003 he telephoned Rasalpur and came to know that the boy had not reached there. He asked the boy’s father, Ganga Prasad Gupta, to come to Shahpur. Later, the son of one Jiwachh Yadav allegedly told the informant that the boy had been taken away by the appellant, as seen by Rabindra Yadav (P.W. 1) of Rasalpur.
On enquiry, P.W. 1 is said to have stated that while attending the call of nature on the embankment in the morning, he saw the appellant taking the boy away on a cycle. Villagers were then called and the appellant was questioned. The informant alleged that the appellant first denied, then on being threatened with police and beating, admitted that he had kidnapped the boy and kept him at his uncle’s house at Kundah Punarwas.
Villagers went to Kundah Punarwas but the uncle reportedly denied the boy’s presence. On their return, the appellant was allegedly threatened again and he then said that he had killed the boy and thrown the body into the Koshi river. With the help of village chaukidar Upendra Sah, the appellant was taken to Nauhatta Police Station. The informant further alleged that the appellant’s father was involved.
Police investigated Nauhatta P.S. Case No. 39 of 2003 and submitted charge‑sheet on 19.12.2003 under Sections 364 and 302/34 IPC. Cognizance was taken on 16.01.2004. On 09.03.2004, charges under Sections 364 and 302 IPC were framed against the appellant in Sessions Trial No. 20 of 2004 before the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 3, Saharsa. After trial, by judgment dated 27.02.2007 and sentence order dated 15.03.2007, the trial court convicted the appellant and awarded life imprisonment with fine.
The appellant challenged this conviction and sentence before the Patna High Court in Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 574 of 2007.
What the Court Examined and Decided
The Division Bench of the Patna High Court, comprising Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Kumar Singh and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ansul, heard the appeal. The Court noted at the outset that this was a case resting entirely on circumstantial evidence: there was no direct eyewitness to the killing itself and nothing was recovered from the appellant linking him directly to the crime.
The prosecution examined ten witnesses, while the defence examined six. The High Court carefully assessed each set of evidence.
P.W. 1, Rabindra Kumar Yadav, was the principal “last seen” witness. He deposed that on 26.09.2003 at about 06:00 AM he went to attend the call of nature and saw the deceased with the appellant near a kerosene oil depot. The Court treated this as evidence that the boy was last seen with the appellant, but also noted that this crucial link rested on a single witness.
P.W. 2, Gauri Devi, is the appellant’s wife and sister of the deceased. She spoke about a three‑year dispute with her husband and claimed he had threatened to kill her brother. She also said she learnt from P.W. 1 that her husband had taken her brother on a cycle and that she identified the dead body. However, her statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. was recorded more than a month after the incident, on 08.11.2003, and according to the defence, she had not then stated that the appellant killed the boy.
The Court recorded that the defence tried to confront her with her earlier police statement, but since the Investigating Officer (I.O.) was never examined, the alleged contradictions could not be formally proved in the manner laid down in Sections 145 and 155 of the Evidence Act and clarified in Tahsildar Singh & Another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1959 SC 1012). This was one of the major weaknesses in the prosecution case.
P.W. 3, 4 and 5 (Dhanik Lal Mukhiya, Shyam Sunder Sah and Chiranjiv Prasad Gupta) were mainly witnesses to an alleged extra‑judicial confession by the appellant on 26.09.2003. They claimed that the appellant admitted tying a “gamchha” around the boy’s neck, killing him and throwing the body into the river. They also said this statement was written and signed by the appellant.
The Court noted several problems here. P.W. 3 admitted that the written report (FIR) was drafted by him. P.W. 4 admitted that he had not told the police about important details he mentioned in court, such as questioning by family members in a harsh manner and the “Bidai” dispute. P.W. 5 was not a charge‑sheet witness and he admitted not seeing the boy being taken away, learning everything through P.W. 1. Again, because the I.O. was not examined, the defence could not properly prove contradictions between their police and court statements.
P.W. 6, the boy’s father, and P.W. 10, the informant uncle, were not eyewitnesses. They mainly narrated what others told them and spoke of the alleged confession. The Court treated much of this as hearsay. P.W. 6 also said they identified the body from clothes and sacred thread, but neither articles were seized by police. The Court treated this as a serious lapse reducing the reliability of identification.
P.W. 7, Anil Kumar Yadav, claimed that he and P.W. 1 were returning with the boy after attending the call of nature when near the oil depot the appellant seated the boy on his cycle and took him away for a ride. But his name did not appear in the FIR, which mentioned only P.W. 1 as having seen the appellant with the boy. His police statement was recorded only the next day. He could not name the teachers or others at the coaching centre or even the owner of the depot. The Court found his evidence unconvincing.
P.W. 9, the doctor, conducted postmortem on 29.09.2003 at 10:30 AM. He found a thin towel tied with two tight knots on the right side of the neck and, after removing it, a horizontal ligature mark fully around the neck, with fracture of the hyoid bone. He opined the cause of death as asphyxia due to strangulation, clearly ruling out accidental drowning.
However, he also said he handed over the towel to a constable, but there was no mention of this in the postmortem report and the towel was neither seized nor produced as an exhibit. This meant there was nothing to connect that towel, or any weapon of strangulation, with the appellant.
The defence witnesses tried to build an alternative story: D.W. 1 and D.W. 2, co‑villagers, said they saw the appellant in his village Kundah around 05:00–06:00 AM on 26.09.2003 and that the Koshi was in heavy flood and could be crossed only by boat. They also spoke of the appellant’s disturbed mind and treatment by a doctor (D.W. 5) in 2002–2003, and claimed to have heard that the boy drowned in the river. D.W. 3 and D.W. 4 said they met the boy on the embankment that morning and later heard he had drowned, but both admitted they did not see the drowning and could not name who informed them.
The Court found these defence stories unreliable as positive proof of accidental death but treated them as showing that another hypothesis was possible and not ruled out by the prosecution.
The Bench then applied the five “golden principles” for circumstantial evidence laid down in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1984 SC 1622) and earlier in Hanumant vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (1953 SCR 1091). These demand a fully established chain of circumstances consistent only with guilt, of a conclusive nature, excluding every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
The Court held that only one circumstance could be said to have been proved with some certainty: that the boy was last seen with the appellant around 06:00 AM on 26.09.2003 based on the solitary testimony of P.W. 1. Medical evidence supported homicidal death by strangulation. But there was no reliable evidence connecting the appellant to the act of killing.
The alleged motive was the strained matrimonial relationship between the appellant and his wife, the boy’s sister, and the “Bidai” dispute two days earlier. The Court observed that this discord had continued for a long time without any criminal case such as under Section 498A IPC. In that context, it found it unlikely that such a quarrel would by itself lead to the murder of a ten‑year‑old child unconnected to the dispute. Relying on Pannayar vs. State of Tamil Nadu (2009) 9 SCC 152, the Court emphasised that in a case based purely on circumstantial evidence, absence or weakness of motive weighs in favour of the accused.
The Court also examined the delay in lodging the FIR. The child went missing in the morning of 26.09.2003, but the FIR was registered only at 01:15 PM on 27.09.2003, more than 30 hours later. P.W. 10 admitted that the appellant had been taken to the police station around 10 PM on 26.09.2003 and that the police searched till about 2 AM. P.W. 3 also said the appellant was sent with the chaukidar that night. Yet no FIR was registered until the next afternoon, on a report drafted by P.W. 3 himself. With the I.O. not examined, there was no explanation for this. Citing Thulia Kali vs. State of Tamil Nadu (1972) 3 SCC 393, the Court held that such delay robbed the case of spontaneity.
The Court was particularly critical of two major aspects: non‑examination of the Investigating Officer and the manner of examining the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
Because the I.O. was not examined, the defence was deprived of the legal right to prove contradictions in witness statements, to question the manner of recording the alleged confession, and to test the story of recovery of the body and articles. Essential evidence about seizure of clothes, sacred thread or the towel was missing. The Court described this as failure of the I.O. in his “basic duty”, making the prosecution case even shakier.
On Section 313 Cr.P.C., the Court referred to State of U.P. vs. Mohd. Iqram (2011) 8 SCC 80, Naval Kishore Singh vs. State of Bihar (2004) 7 SCC 502, Tara Singh vs. State (AIR 1951 SC 441) and Sharad Birdhichand Sarda. It reiterated that each material circumstance must be put clearly and separately to the accused, and any circumstance not put cannot be used against him.
In this case, the trial court had asked a vague composite question suggesting that between 26 and 28 September 2003 at Shahpur the appellant kidnapped, killed and threw the body at Baluaha Ghat. This did not match the prosecution story that the body was thrown somewhere into the Koshi river. More importantly, the “star material” – the alleged extra‑judicial confession – was never put to the appellant at all.
The High Court held that this omission caused real prejudice. Since the appellant was not given an opportunity to explain the alleged confession, the Court ruled that the confession could not be considered for conviction.
Putting all these factors together – a solitary and weak “last seen” circumstance, flimsy motive, doubtful extra‑judicial confession, serious investigation lapses, unproved contradictions, unexplained FIR delay and defective Section 313 examination – the Bench concluded that the chain of circumstances was incomplete. There remained reasonable doubt whether the appellant had killed the boy, even though the boy had undoubtedly died by strangulation.
Given that the incident dated back to 2003, the Court also felt that sending the matter back for a fresh Section 313 examination would be unjust. Instead, it allowed the appeal, set aside the trial court’s judgment of conviction dated 27.02.2007 and sentence dated 15.03.2007 in Sessions Trial No. 20 of 2004, and acquitted the appellant of all charges. As the appellant was already on bail, he was discharged from the liabilities of his bail bond.
Why This Judgment Matters
This decision of the Patna High Court is important for anyone facing serious criminal charges based only on circumstantial evidence. It shows that “last seen” evidence by one person, without strong supporting material, is not enough to sustain a life sentence.
The judgment highlights how vital it is for police to do basic things correctly: seize clothes and articles used in the crime, record and preserve statements properly, and produce the Investigating Officer in court. Failure in these duties can result in collapse of the prosecution.
The Court also underlines that extra‑judicial confessions obtained by threat, or recorded in the presence of police, are weak and often unusable. And if such a confession is not put to the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C., it simply cannot be relied upon to convict.
For families involved in matrimonial disputes, the case also shows that strained relations alone cannot automatically be treated as a strong motive for extreme crimes like murder, especially where there is no prior criminal case between the spouses.
Legal Issues and Answers
Issue: Could the appellant’s conviction for kidnapping and murder under Sections 364 and 302 IPC be upheld on the basis of a single “last seen” witness, a disputed extra‑judicial confession and general motive of matrimonial discord?
Answer: No. The Patna High Court held that the circumstantial chain was incomplete, the extra‑judicial confession was unreliable and not put to the accused, the motive was weak, and serious investigative lapses created reasonable doubt, requiring acquittal.
Issue: What is the effect of non‑examination of the Investigating Officer and improper questioning of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C.?
Answer: Non‑examination of the I.O. prevented proper proof of contradictions and explanation of investigation lapses, prejudicing the defence. Vague Section 313 questions and omission to put key incriminating material (extra‑judicial confession) meant those circumstances could not be used against the accused.
Issue: How did the Court treat delay in FIR and alleged motive in a circumstantial evidence case?
Answer: The unexplained 30‑hour delay and the fact that the appellant had been taken to the police station much earlier undermined the spontaneity of the prosecution story. The alleged motive of general matrimonial discord was considered flimsy in light of absence of any prior criminal proceedings.
Cases Cited by the Court
- Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622
- Hanumant vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1953 SCR 1091
- Tahsildar Singh & Another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1959 SC 1012
- Pannayar vs. State of Tamil Nadu by Inspector of Police, (2009) 9 SCC 152
- Thulia Kali vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1972) 3 SCC 393
- State of U.P. vs. Mohd. Iqram & Anr., (2011) 8 SCC 80
- Naval Kishore Singh vs. State of Bihar, (2004) 7 SCC 502
- Tara Singh vs. State, AIR 1951 SC 441
Case Details
Case Number: Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 574 of 2007; CNR No. BRHC010376152007
Case Title: Rajesh Gupta @ Rajesh Prasad Gupta vs. State of Bihar
Citation: 2026 (6) PLJR 281
Court: High Court of Judicature at Patna
Bench (Coram): Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Kumar Singh and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ansul
Date of High Court Judgment: 01.10.2026
Impugned Judgment: Judgment of conviction dated 27.02.2007 and order of sentence dated 15.03.2007 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 3, Saharsa in Sessions Trial No. 20 of 2004, arising out of Nauhatta P.S. Case No. 39 of 2003
Advocates: Mr. Fazle Karim, Advocate for the appellant; Mr. Dilip Kumar Sinha, APP for the State
Nature of Case: Criminal appeal (Division Bench) against conviction and sentence under Sections 364 and 302 IPC in a sessions trial
Result: Appeal allowed; conviction and sentence set aside; appellant acquitted; bail bonds discharged
Link: https://patnahighcourt.gov.in/viewjudgment/NSM1NzQjMjAwNyMxI04=-gRcyN2–ak1—-am1–p0o=
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