Case Background
The case arose from recruitment to the post of Deputy Registrar (UR category) in Dr. Rajendra Prasad Central Agricultural University, Pusa, Samastipur (RPCAU).
The petitioners were earlier working as Deputy Registrars on deputation in RPCAU. An advertisement bearing No. 01 of 2020 dated 06.02.2020 was issued for appointment to the post of Registrar on permanent basis. The essential qualification mentioned was a Master’s Degree with minimum 55% marks or equivalent Grade “B” in the UGC 7‑point scale from a recognized institution, along with specified experience in educational administration or equivalent posts. The advertisement also stated that the method of selection would be direct recruitment.
The petitioners submitted applications pursuant to this advertisement. Their applications were scrutinized by a Screening Committee, which found them eligible and called them for interview before the Selection Committee on 08.09.2020.
The Selection Committee found the petitioners suitable for appointment as Deputy Registrar (UR category) by way of direct recruitment and recommended their names. The Board of Management and the Vice‑Chancellor approved this recommendation. RPCAU issued offers of appointment to the petitioners on 11.09.2020 and they joined as Deputy Registrars.
While the petitioners were discharging duties on the post of Deputy Registrar, a complaint was filed before the Department of Agricultural Research and Education (DARE) alleging administrative and financial irregularities by the Dean and the Vice‑Chancellor. The Hon’ble Visitor of the University ordered an enquiry into these allegations.
A two‑member enquiry committee was constituted, which examined the allegations and submitted its report. The report was placed before the Hon’ble Visitor, who directed that action be taken under Section 9(6) of the RPCAU Act, 2016.
The enquiry report was then sent to the Vice‑Chancellor, RPCAU. The Vice‑Chancellor constituted a three‑member internal committee to examine the report. This internal committee recommended that departmental proceedings be initiated against the petitioners.
The Chief Vigilance Officer placed the internal committee’s report before the Board of Management. In its 21st meeting held on 06.12.2023, under Agenda No. 21.8, the Board of Management resolved to initiate departmental proceedings against the petitioners under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965).
The Board further authorized the Vice‑Chancellor to issue charge‑sheets, appoint an Enquiry Officer and Presenting Officer, take decisions in the course of the enquiry, and place the enquiry report before the Board where the Board acts as Disciplinary Authority.
Thereafter, the Chief Vigilance Officer issued Memorandum Nos. 17 and 18 dated 02.04.2025, proposing departmental proceedings against the petitioners under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, “for and on behalf of” the Disciplinary Authority. The same communication also indicated appointment of an Enquiry Officer and Presenting Officer.
The enquiry proceeded and the Enquiry Officer submitted an enquiry report dated 02.02.2026 holding the charges proved against the petitioners.
The petitioners approached the Patna High Court under its writ jurisdiction. They sought quashing of Memorandum Nos. 17 and 18 dated 02.04.2025. They also sought quashing of the Board of Management resolution dated 06.12.2023 (Agenda No. 21.8) approving the internal committee report and the initiation of departmental proceedings. After the enquiry report was submitted, they challenged that report as well by filing an interlocutory application.
What the Court Examined and Decided
Justice Harish Kumar heard detailed arguments from both sides and carefully examined the records of the departmental proceedings, which had been called for by the Court.
On behalf of the petitioners, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Shivendra Kishore raised several grounds. Among them were:
(a) There was delay in issuing the memorandum dated 02.04.2025, even though, according to the petitioners, their eligibility was known to the respondents as far back as 2018, and no reasons were given for such delay.
(b) Under Rule 14(3)(b) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, the Board of Management, being the appointing and disciplinary authority, had to approve the charge‑sheet before its issuance. The petitioners contended that no such specific approval for the charge memo had been obtained.
(c) Continuation of the enquiry without supplying all defence documents and without allowing defence assistance from another station was alleged to violate principles of natural justice and the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965.
(d) The memo of charge itself was said to be illegal as it was not issued with prior approval of the appointing/disciplinary authority, i.e. the Board of Management. Therefore, all subsequent actions, including the enquiry and report, were argued to be void.
To support these submissions, reliance was placed on Supreme Court judgments in Union of India and Others v. B.V. Gopinath, (2014) 1 SCC 351, and Sunny Abraham v. Union of India, (2021) 20 SCC 12. These decisions interpret Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules and Article 311 of the Constitution on who must approve and issue a charge‑sheet in departmental proceedings.
On behalf of RPCAU, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Amit Srivastava opposed the writ petitions. He argued that the petitioners had applied without possessing the required eligibility because they were not holding analogous posts on regular basis in any State or Central autonomous body, contrary to the advertisement. According to him, the Screening Committee wrongly treated them as eligible and recommended their names, and a charge‑sheet had also been framed against the members of that Committee.
He submitted that based on public complaints, the Hon’ble Visitor (President of India) exercised powers under Section 9 of the RPCAU Act, 2016 and ordered an enquiry through DARE. After examining the DARE report, the Visitor directed action under Section 9(6). The Vice‑Chancellor, acting under this provision, placed the matter before the Board of Management in its 21st meeting under Agenda No. 21.8.
The Board of Management then resolved to initiate detailed enquiry under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 for major penalty. It authorized the Vice‑Chancellor to approve appointment of the Enquiry Officer and Presenting Officer, to issue charge‑sheets, to take day‑to‑day decisions in the enquiry, and to submit the enquiry report to the Board for its decision wherever the Board is the disciplinary authority.
Mr. Srivastava clarified that the Vice‑Chancellor did not delegate his power further to the Chief Vigilance Officer. According to him, the Chief Vigilance Officer only communicated and notified the orders of the Vice‑Chancellor. This was said to be clear from the communications, which recited that they were issued “for and on behalf of the competent authority”.
He argued that since the appointing authority (Board of Management) had already approved the charges against the petitioners on the basis of documents placed before it in the meeting of 06.12.2023, and authorized the Vice‑Chancellor to issue the charge‑sheets, there was no need to again place the detailed charge memo before the Board for its specific approval.
After hearing both sides, the Court narrowed the case down to a single legal question: whether approval granted by the Board of Management at the stage of initiating the departmental proceedings was sufficient to cover the issuance of the charge memo, or whether fresh and specific approval of the Board was mandatorily required before the charge memo could be issued under Rule 14(3)(b) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965.
The Court then examined Rule 14 in detail. Rule 14(3) states that where it is proposed to hold an enquiry against a government servant under Rule 14 or 15, the disciplinary authority shall “draw up or cause to be drawn up” the charge‑sheet. Rule 14(4) requires that the disciplinary authority deliver, or cause to be delivered, a copy of the articles of charge, statement of imputations, and supporting documents, with a list of witnesses.
In B.V. Gopinath, the Supreme Court had rejected the argument that once the disciplinary authority approved initiation of proceedings, the charge‑sheet could be drawn up by some other authority without its further approval. The Supreme Court held that such a practice would destroy the protection under Article 311(1) and violate the procedural safeguard under Article 311(2). A charge‑sheet must be issued only after approval of the appointing authority.
The Patna High Court carefully discussed how, in B.V. Gopinath, it was held that while an authority subordinate to the disciplinary authority may prepare the draft charges (“cause to be drawn up”), those draft articles become final only after specific approval by the disciplinary authority. The Finance Minister in that case was required to approve not just initiation, but also the finalized charge memo itself.
The Court also referred to Sahni Silk Mills Private Limited v. E.S.I. Corporation, (1994) 5 SCC 346, on the principle that where Parliament has specifically entrusted a function to an authority, it cannot normally be presumed that the authority is free to allow yet another body to act in its place by sub‑delegation.
Next, the Court relied on State of Tamil Nadu v. Pramod Kumar, (2018) 17 SCC 677, where the Supreme Court rejected the argument that initiation of proceedings and issuance of charge memo are the “same stage” and that only one approval is needed. The Supreme Court reiterated the rule that where a statute requires an act to be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner or not at all.
The Court further cited Sunny Abraham, where the Supreme Court again held that approval for initiating disciplinary proceedings and approval of the charge memorandum are “two divisible acts”. If approval at the second stage is missing, the charge memo is fundamentally defective and non‑existent in law (“stillborn”), and subsequent approval cannot cure it.
Applying these principles, the Patna High Court examined the records of RPCAU. It found that the Board of Management, acting as disciplinary authority, had indeed approved initiation of departmental proceedings and had authorized the Vice‑Chancellor to issue charge‑sheets and appoint Enquiry and Presenting Officers.
However, it was undisputed, on the basis of the records and the affidavit of RPCAU, that no specific approval of the Board of Management was taken at the time of issuing the actual charge memo to the petitioners.
The Court held that this failure meant the mandate of Rule 14(3)(b) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 had not been complied with. Any action inconsistent with Article 311 of the Constitution not only destroys the protection guaranteed under Article 311(1) but also violates Article 311(2), which requires a fair procedure giving the public servant a reasonable opportunity to meet the allegations in the charge‑sheet.
The Court accepted the petitioners’ contention that approval for initiation of departmental proceedings by the Board in its meeting dated 06.12.2023, even though it authorized the Vice‑Chancellor to issue charge‑sheets and appoint enquiry officials, did not dispense with the Board’s duty to accord specific approval to the finalized memo of charge before it was issued to the delinquent officers.
Such action, the Court held, does not meet the standard of fairness under Rule 14(3)(b) and under Article 311(1) and (2). Consequently, the Court concluded that the charge memo and all subsequent steps based on it were legally unsustainable.
Accordingly, the Patna High Court set aside all further proceedings in the departmental enquiry against the petitioners, including the issuance of the charge memo and the enquiry report dated 02.02.2026.
At the same time, the Court clarified that the Disciplinary Authority is at liberty to issue a fresh charge memo after obtaining the requisite approval of the Board of Management, in accordance with law. Both writ petitions were allowed, with parties directed to bear their own costs.
Why This Judgment Matters
This judgment is important for employees of universities and other institutions governed by the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, as well as for administrators who conduct departmental enquiries.
The Patna High Court has clearly reinforced that merely approving the idea of starting a disciplinary proceeding is not enough. The disciplinary authority must separately and specifically approve the charge memo which contains the allegations.
If this approval is missing, the Court has confirmed—relying on Supreme Court decisions—that the charge memo is treated as non‑existent in law. Any enquiry and report based on such a defective charge memo must be quashed.
For employees, this judgment shows that they can question departmental actions if the basic legal steps under Rule 14 are not followed. For managements and vigilance officers, it is a reminder that shortcuts in procedure, even when there is a complaint and an enquiry report, can undo the entire process.
The judgment also makes clear that quashing a defective proceeding does not prevent the authority from starting a fresh proceeding, provided it now complies with the legal requirements and obtains the necessary approvals.
Legal Issues and Answers
- Issue: Is approval of the disciplinary authority at the stage of initiating departmental proceedings sufficient, or is separate approval required before issuing the charge memo under Rule 14(3)(b) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965?
Answer: Separate and specific approval of the disciplinary authority (here, the Board of Management) is mandatory before issuing the charge memo. Approval only for initiation of proceedings is not enough. - Issue: What is the effect of issuing a charge memo without such approval of the disciplinary authority?
Answer: A charge memo issued without the disciplinary authority’s approval is fundamentally defective and non‑est in law. All subsequent steps, including enquiry and enquiry report, are liable to be set aside, though fresh proceedings may be initiated after proper approval.
Cases Cited by the Court
- Union of India and Others v. B.V. Gopinath, (2014) 1 SCC 351
- Sahni Silk Mills Private Limited v. E.S.I. Corporation, (1994) 5 SCC 346
- State of Tamil Nadu v. Pramod Kumar, (2018) 17 SCC 677
- Sunny Abraham v. Union of India, (2021) 20 SCC 12
Case Details
Case Number: Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 1734 of 2026, heard with Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 1797 of 2026
Case Title: Mahesh Hooda v. Dr. Rajendra Prasad Central Agricultural University Pusa & Others; Dr. Ramesh Kumar Pathak v. Dr. Rajendra Prasad Central Agricultural University Pusa & Others
Citation: 2026 (6) PLJR 212
Court: High Court of Judicature at Patna
Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Harish Kumar
Date of Judgment: 01.10.2026
Advocates:
In Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 1734 of 2026:
- For the petitioner: Mr. Shivendra Kishore, Senior Advocate; Mr. Saroj Kumar, Advocate
- For the respondents: Mr. Amit Srivastava, Senior Advocate; Mr. Vijay Shankar Upadhyay, Advocate
In Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 1797 of 2026:
- For the petitioner: Mr. Prisu Snehil, Advocate
- For the respondents: Mr. Amit Srivastava, Senior Advocate; Mr. Vijay Shankar Upadhyay, Advocate
Nature of the Case: Writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging initiation and conduct of departmental proceedings, including memoranda of charge and enquiry report, in respect of university officers governed by the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965.
Link: https://patnahighcourt.gov.in/viewjudgment/MTUjMTczNCMyMDI2IzEjTg==-YHkf4ugyRbA=
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