Case Background
This case arises from a dispute over appointment to the post of Panchayat Teacher in Gram Panchayat Raj Dumariya, Shahpur Block, District Bhojpur.
The post was advertised during the second phase of teachers’ employment. It was reserved for unreserved category physically handicapped women candidates. For this purpose, a merit list was prepared and published on 06.01.2009.
In that list, the present appellant was placed among the selected candidates. Her position depended on the marks shown against her Intermediate examination. On this basis she was issued an appointment letter dated 14.08.2010, vide Memo No. 26, and joined as Panchayat Teacher.
Some time later, another candidate, who is respondent no. 11 in the appeal and was the writ petitioner before the Single Judge, obtained a copy of the appellant’s marksheet from the Bihar Intermediate Education Council. She claimed that the appellant’s actual marks were much lower than what had been used for preparing the merit list, and alleged that the appellant’s appointment was based on a forged and fabricated marksheet.
The writ petitioner first approached the Patna High Court by filing C.W.J.C. No. 23049 of 2012. That writ petition was disposed of on 04.09.2017, giving liberty to her to approach the District Appellate Authority within thirty days.
Acting on this liberty, she filed Appeal Case No. 37 of 2017 before the District Appellate Authority, Bhojpur at Ara. The present appellant appeared there and filed her reply. In that proceeding, she stated that she had secured 384 marks out of 900 marks in the Intermediate of Arts Examination, 1994.
Despite this, the District Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal mainly on the ground of inordinate delay in challenging the appointment. The State Appellate Authority, Bihar, Patna dismissed the further appeal (Case No. Appeal/530/2018) on 10.12.2018 and upheld the District Authority’s decision.
Against these two appellate orders, the writ petitioner filed C.W.J.C. No. 4933 of 2019 before a learned Single Judge of the Patna High Court. By judgment dated 12.01.2024, the Single Judge set aside both the appellate orders and also set aside the appellant’s appointment as Panchayat Teacher, holding that it was obtained on the basis of a forged marksheet and was void from the beginning.
The present Letters Patent Appeal No. 106 of 2024 was then filed by the former teacher, challenging the Single Judge’s decision.
What the Court Examined and Decided
The Division Bench of the Patna High Court, comprising Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bibek Chaudhuri and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rana Vikram Singh, heard the appeal. The C.A.V. judgment was delivered on 08.10.2026, authored by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rana Vikram Singh.
The central question before the Court was whether the Single Judge was right in interfering with the appellant’s appointment on the ground that it was obtained using a forged and fabricated Intermediate marksheet.
On behalf of the appellant, senior counsel argued that she was selected through a proper selection process, on the basis of a merit list prepared by competent authorities. It was contended that the appointment should not have been disturbed after many years, especially as she had served for a long period.
The appellant’s counsel also argued that the Single Judge did not fully appreciate the alleged weaknesses in the writ petitioner’s case. According to them, the writ petitioner’s claim for appointment in place of the appellant could not be accepted merely on allegations about the authenticity of the marksheet. The memorandum of appeal questioned the Single Judge’s appreciation of evidence, and attacked the finding that the appellant used a forged document. It was also argued that the selection process was being challenged after considerable delay.
On the other hand, the State, through learned counsel, supported the Single Judge’s judgment. The State’s stand was clear: the appellant’s appointment was based squarely on the marks shown for her Intermediate examination, and the documents on record showed a large gap between the marks reflected in the document used for selection and the marks she had actually obtained.
The State pointed out that before the District Appellate Authority, the appellant herself had admitted that she obtained 384 marks out of 900 in Intermediate, i.e., 42.66%. However, in the merit list she was shown as having scored 72.77%. This meant that the very basis on which she got a higher rank in the merit list was unreliable.
The Division Bench carefully examined the Single Judge’s judgment, the appellate orders, and the materials placed on record.
The Court noted that the selection to the Panchayat Teacher’s post was merit-based. The appellant’s position in the 06.01.2009 merit list depended entirely on her Intermediate marks. According to the records noticed by the Single Judge, she was shown to have obtained 72.77% marks.
However, the marksheet obtained from the Bihar Intermediate Education Council showed that she had actually secured only 384 marks out of 900, which comes to 42.66%. This was not a small or technical difference but a major reduction that directly affected her rank.
Importantly, this was not just an allegation by the rival candidate. The Court highlighted that the appellant herself had admitted before the District Appellate Authority that she obtained only 384 marks out of 900 in the Intermediate of Arts Examination, 1994. Therefore, the Single Judge’s conclusion was based on admitted facts and official records, not on unproven accusations.
Once this discrepancy was established, the Bench held that the very foundation of the appellant’s selection and appointment disappeared. If the actual marks were much lower than the marks on which she was ranked, her appointment could not be sustained in law.
The Court then turned to the legal principle that governs such situations. It referred to the Latin maxim “fraus omnia corrumpit” — fraud vitiates everything. Anything obtained through fraud is void from the very beginning and cannot be cured later, nor can it be given legitimacy by passage of time or by any act of the parties.
The Bench cited the Supreme Court judgment in Jainendra Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (2012) 8 SCC 748. That decision held that when an appointment is obtained on the basis of forged documents, it amounts to misrepresentation and fraud on the employer. In such a situation, no right or equity is created in favour of the candidate, and there is no bar against termination even without holding a departmental inquiry.
The Bench further referred to the Supreme Court decision in Vijay Kishanrao Kurundkar and another vs. State of Maharashtra and others, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 834. There, the Supreme Court reiterated that an appointment obtained on the basis of a fraudulent certificate is void ab initio and the government cannot protect such appointments through circulars or resolutions.
These principles, the Bench observed, draw strength from the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Chairman and Managing Director, Food Corporation of India vs. Jagdish Balram Bahira, (2017) 8 SCC 670.
Applying these settled principles, the Division Bench held that an appointment obtained by relying on a document which does not show the candidate’s real academic performance cannot be allowed to stand merely because many years have passed or because the person has been working during that period. Fraud and misrepresentation cut at the root and make the appointment void.
The Court agreed with the Single Judge’s categorical finding that the appellant had secured appointment on the strength of a forged and fabricated marksheet, and that the fraud went to the root of the appointment.
On the issue of delay, the Bench was not persuaded by the appellant. It noted that the writ petitioner had not slept over her rights. She had approached the High Court as early as 2012 and, following the order passed in that writ petition on 04.09.2017, she had moved the District Appellate Authority within the permitted time. After the District Appellate Authority’s order, she went to the State Appellate Authority and, when that also went against her on 10.12.2018, she promptly filed C.W.J.C. No. 4933 of 2019.
From this chronology, the Court concluded that the writ petitioner had been diligent. Her challenge could not be rejected on the ground of delay, especially when the case involved allegations of fraud in public employment.
The Bench also emphasised an important additional aspect. After finding the appellant’s appointment illegal, the Single Judge did not automatically direct that the writ petitioner be appointed to the vacant post. Instead, the Single Judge examined whether the writ petitioner fulfilled the current eligibility requirements.
The Court noted that the writ petitioner had not acquired the requisite teachers’ training during the long pendency of the dispute. In light of the Notification dated 09.08.2017 issued under Section 23(2) of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 and the instructions issued under it, the Single Judge declined to order her appointment.
The Division Bench underlined this point to show that the Single Judge took a balanced view. The Court only removed an illegally appointed candidate; it did not mechanically substitute the appellant with the writ petitioner.
Finally, the Bench reminded that although the High Court’s jurisdiction in Letters Patent Appeals is wide, interference is justified only where there is an error of law, perversity, or serious misreading of the record. In this case, the Single Judge had properly considered the documents, the appellate proceedings, and the appellant’s own admission about her marks. The conclusion that the appointment was based on a forged marksheet was fully supported by the record.
The counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent nos. 5 and 6 (District Education Officer and District Programme Officer) also supported the facts recorded by the Single Judge and did not present any new material that could change the view.
Therefore, the Division Bench held that there was no infirmity in the Single Judge’s judgment. The Letters Patent Appeal was found to be devoid of merit and was dismissed. There was no order as to costs, and any interlocutory applications stood disposed of.
Why This Judgment Matters
This judgment is important for candidates, government employees, and officials involved in public appointments in Bihar.
First, it shows that if a government job is taken on the basis of a forged marksheet or certificate, the job can be cancelled even after many years of service. Length of service will not protect an appointment that started with fraud.
Second, it reassures genuine candidates that their complaints about forged documents will be taken seriously, provided they act diligently and pursue their remedies in time.
Third, the judgment makes clear that courts will not automatically give a job to the complainant. Even if the selected candidate is removed, the complainant must meet all current eligibility conditions, such as required teacher training under the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009.
For Panchayat Teacher appointments and other local recruitment processes, the ruling reinforces that official records and actual marks will prevail over any manipulated documents, and that fraud will not be tolerated.
Legal Issues and Answers
- Issue: Whether the Single Judge was justified in setting aside the appellant’s appointment as Panchayat Teacher on the ground that it was obtained using a forged and fabricated Intermediate marksheet.
Answer: Yes. The Division Bench held that the appellant’s actual marks (384 out of 900, 42.66%) were much lower than the marks shown in the merit list (72.77%), that the appellant admitted her actual marks, and that an appointment obtained on the basis of a forged document is void ab initio and cannot be protected by lapse of time. - Issue: Whether the challenge to the appellant’s appointment failed due to delay by the writ petitioner.
Answer: No. The Court held that the writ petitioner had been diligently pursuing her remedies since 2012, and that in a case of fraud in public employment, delay could not defeat the challenge in the given facts. - Issue: Whether the writ petitioner was entitled to be appointed in place of the appellant after the latter’s appointment was cancelled.
Answer: No. The Court noted that the writ petitioner had not acquired the requisite teachers’ training as per Notification dated 09.08.2017 under Section 23(2) of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, and therefore no positive direction for her appointment could be issued.
Cases Cited by the Court
- Jainendra Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary, Home and others, (2012) 8 SCC 748.
- Vijay Kishanrao Kurundkar and another vs. State of Maharashtra and others, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 834.
- Chairman and Managing Director, Food Corporation of India vs. Jagdish Balram Bahira, (2017) 8 SCC 670.
Case Details
Case Number: Letters Patent Appeal No. 106 of 2024 in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 4933 of 2019
Case Title: Punam Kumari vs. The State of Bihar and others
Citation: 2026 (6) PLJR 331
CAV Date: 20.07.2026
Judgment Date: 08.10.2026
Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bibek Chaudhuri and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rana Vikram Singh
Advocates:
- For the Appellant: Mr. Yogesh Chandra Verma, Senior Advocate; Mr. G.N. Ojha, Advocate; Mr. Bijay Shankar Choubey, Advocate.
- For the State: Mr. Tej Pratap Singh, AC to AAG-13.
Nature of the Case: Letters Patent Appeal against a Single Judge’s order in a writ petition relating to cancellation of appointment to the post of Panchayat Teacher.
Link: https://patnahighcourt.gov.in/viewjudgment/MyMxMDYjMjAyNCMxI04=-4dVJ5KFRhdM=
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