LPG distributorship cancellation for lack of land ownership upheld — Patna High Court, 2021

Sunita Kumari

Reviewed by: Sunita Kumari

License Number: BR/708/2009

Last Reviewed On: 17-08-2026

Sunita Kumari is a lawyer based in Siwan and Chapra practicing family law. She represents clients in divorce proceedings, matrimonial disputes, and POCSO (Protection of Children from Sexual Offences) matters. Her practice handles family law litigation across the region, including matrimonial property issues, inheritance disputes, and matters involving vulnerable persons.

The petitioner challenged cancellation of her LPG distributorship selection by Indian Oil Corporation Limited. The Patna High Court held that she did not meet the basic land-ownership requirement on the date of application. The Court upheld cancellation of her candidature and the fresh draw of lots in favour of another candidate. The writ petition was dismissed and nothing further was granted to the petitioner.

Case Background

The case arose from a recruitment process for an LPG Gramin Distributor at Chhitauni, Block Basopatti, District Madhubani, conducted by Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOCL).

An advertisement was published in the Hindi daily Dainik Jagran on 17.06.2017 inviting applications for the LPG distributorship at this rural location.

The petitioner submitted her application along with other candidates. A draw of lots was conducted on 10.01.2019. In this draw, the petitioner was declared successful.

After being selected, the petitioner deposited Rs. 20,000 as security money for field verification. She then submitted documents and offered two different pieces of land: one for a godown and another for a showroom.

Both plots were covered by registered lease deeds dated 04.08.2017 for a period of 15 years. These lease deeds contained a clause that the lease period would start from the date of issuance of a Letter of Intent (LOI) by IOCL so that rent became payable only from that date.

After field verification, IOCL cancelled the petitioner’s candidature through a letter dated 26.06.2019 issued by the Chief Area Manager, Indane Area Office, Begusarai. The stated reason was that she did not fulfil the condition of “owning” suitable land for godown and showroom as on the date of submission of the application.

Subsequently, on 14.05.2019, a rectification lease deed was executed between the petitioner and the lessor. This rectification stated that the 15-year lease period would commence from the original execution date, i.e., 04.08.2017, instead of from the date of LOI.

Meanwhile, IOCL conducted a fresh draw of lots on 19.11.2019, in which respondent no. 6 was selected for the LPG distributorship.

The petitioner filed a writ petition before the Patna High Court seeking quashing of IOCL’s letter dated 26.06.2019 cancelling her candidature and a declaration that the fresh draw of lots held on 19.11.2019 in favour of respondent no. 6 was null and void.

What the Court Examined and Decided

Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mohit Kumar Shah heard the matter through video conferencing on account of the COVID-19 pandemic. The core dispute was whether, on the date of her application, the petitioner satisfied the land requirement under IOCL’s selection guidelines.

The petitioner argued that the lease deeds dated 04.08.2017, read with the rectification deed dated 14.05.2019, showed that she had valid long-term leases for both godown and showroom land. According to her, a lease deed cannot be “futuristic” and is effective from the date of execution, regardless of the clause linking its commencement to the LOI. She contended that IOCL wrongly ignored the rectification and treated her as not having land on the relevant date.

To support her case, the petitioner relied on earlier decisions of the Patna High Court:

  • The judgment reported in 2019(4) PLJR 663, Shankar Kumar Bhagat vs. The Indian Oil Corporation & Ors.
  • The judgment dated 14.09.2020 in Priya Kumari vs. Indian Oil Corporation & Ors., CWJC No. 7292 of 2020.

In Shankar Kumar Bhagat, a coordinate Bench had examined a lease deed executed on 18.12.2018. That deed clearly stated that the land was being provided on lease “from today” for 29 years and that possession had been handed over to the lessee on that date. Though the deed also mentioned that the lease period would be counted from the date of receipt of the petrol pump licence, the Court treated that later clause as inconsistent with the clear earlier stipulation. Considering the rectification deed in that case, the Court held that the lease was effective from the date of execution, and IOCL’s rejection of the candidate was set aside.

In Priya Kumari, the Court examined a case where the applicant had correctly mentioned the plot number in her application, but the lease deed contained a typographical error in the plot number. That error was later rectified by a rectification deed. The Court held that this type of error was rectifiable and did not fall under non-rectifiable deficiencies mentioned in the IOCL FAQs, because the applicant was not seeking any change in land details as mentioned in the application itself. The rejection of candidature there was held unreasonable and arbitrary.

On the other side, learned Senior Counsel for IOCL argued that the petitioner did not meet the basic land requirement as per the guidelines. For the relevant SP (W) category, IOCL’s selection guidelines required:

“Land documents: Documents pertaining to land/ godown/showroom in the name of applicant or member of ‘family unit’, Registered sale deed/ Gift Deed/ Lease Deed (15 years minimum), Mutation and Government records (self-attested photocopy of the original).”

IOCL emphasised that, as per the brochure (also reflected on page 17 of the writ petition), ownership or lease of land must be valid as on specified dates, including the date of application. The land had to be “available with the applicant” on that date.

According to IOCL, the field verification revealed that the lease deeds dated 04.08.2017 did not clearly state that the leases were effective for a 15-year period from any date between the advertisement date (17.06.2017) and the date of application. Instead, they linked the commencement of the lease to the date when the petitioner would be appointed as a distributor of the gas agency.

IOCL argued that, only after this defect was pointed out during field verification did the petitioner execute the rectification deed dated 14.05.2019, much after the date of application and the draw of lots. IOCL contended that such subsequent rectification could not cure a fundamental deficiency present on the date of application.

In support, IOCL relied on section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, to argue that a lease requires transfer of a right to enjoy immovable property, which includes possession and a clear commencement of the lease term. They submitted that the original lease deeds did not mention that possession was handed over on 04.08.2017 or that the lease began on that date. These deeds showed only the lessor’s willingness to grant the land on rent upon the petitioner being appointed as distributor.

IOCL also cited the judgment reported in 2009(3) PLJR 591, Neeraj Kumar vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. & Ors. In that case, the Court had held that an applicant’s right to be considered crystallises on the date of application and that subsequent documents cannot be looked into to alter the situation. The “cut-off” is the date of filing of the application.

The Patna High Court examined the relevant portions of the petitioner’s lease deeds dated 04.08.2017 in detail. The recitals, quoted in the judgment, showed that:

  • The lease was described as a 15-year arrangement.
  • Clause 1 stated that the lease would be for 15 years, which would become effective from the date the petitioner was appointed as LPG distributor.
  • The deeds fixed yearly rent of Rs. 36,000, payable after the lease came into force.
  • There was no express statement that possession of the land had been handed over to the petitioner on 04.08.2017.

Based on this language, the Court concluded that, on the date of application, the petitioner was not in possession of the land and had no present right to enjoy it. The lease would start only on her appointment as distributor, which had not yet happened. Thus, she did not “own” or hold the land in the sense required by IOCL’s guidelines.

The Court held that this deficiency struck at a “basic requirement” and justified cancellation of her candidature. It further held that the rectification deed dated 14.05.2019, executed after the application date, could not be considered to change the legal position as it stood on the crucial date. Relying on Neeraj Kumar, the Court stated that a candidate cannot be allowed to alter documents submitted with the application form at a later stage.

The Court then referred to another coordinate Bench decision dated 30.07.2019 in CWJC No. 11874 of 2019, Avinash Aarohi vs. The Indian Oil Corporation Limited & Ors. In that case, the lease deed stated that it would be valid for 29 years from the date of receipt of licence from the petroleum company, without any clause confirming that the lease was effective from the date of execution or that possession had been handed over. The Court held there that such a lease did not make land “available” to the applicant on the date of application, and IOCL’s rejection was upheld.

Justice Mohit Kumar Shah found that the present case was “squarely covered” by Avinash Aarohi. The petitioner’s lease deeds similarly linked commencement of the lease to a future event (appointment as distributor), with no clear statement of present possession or current effectiveness on 04.08.2017.

On the other hand, the Court carefully distinguished the judgments relied on by the petitioner:

  • In Shankar Kumar Bhagat, the very lease deed clearly stated that the land was leased “from today” and that possession was given on the date of execution. The later clause tying the lease period to the date of licence was treated as inconsistent but not overriding the first part. In that factual setting, the Court accepted that the applicant already held the land when he applied. Those crucial stipulations were absent in the petitioner’s deeds.
  • In Priya Kumari, the issue was a typographical error in the plot number of the lease deed, not a lack of possession or a future-start lease. The application itself contained correct land details, and the rectification only corrected a mistake. Here, by contrast, the problem was that the petitioner’s right to the land itself was to begin only in future.

Having considered the rival submissions and precedents, the Court held that the petitioner did not have any land “available” on the date of submission of her application. The candidate selected in the fresh draw of lots therefore could not be displaced.

Accordingly, the Court found no merit in the writ petition and dismissed it. The cancellation letter dated 26.06.2019 and the subsequent selection of respondent no. 6 remained undisturbed.

Why This Judgment Matters

This judgment is significant for people applying for LPG distributorships and similar government-linked contracts that require land.

It clarifies that the land offered in the application must be genuinely available to the applicant on the date of application, not conditional on some future event like appointment or licence.

A lease deed that says the lease will start only when a licence or distributorship is granted may not satisfy this requirement. Such an arrangement shows only future intention, not present rights.

The Court also reinforced that defects going to the basic requirement—such as absence of current possession or effective lease—cannot be cured later by executing a rectification deed after the application date. The authorities and the Court will look at the situation as it stood when the application was filed.

For applicants, this means that they must ensure that their lease or ownership documents clearly state that the lease is effective from the date of execution and that possession has been given, if they wish to rely on that land for eligibility.

Legal Issues and Answers

  • Issue: Did the petitioner satisfy IOCL’s requirement of owning or holding suitable land for godown and showroom as on the date of application for LPG distributorship?
    Answer: No. The Court held that the lease deeds made the lease effective only from the date of appointment as distributor, with no clear present possession on the application date, so the basic land requirement was not met.
  • Issue: Could the later rectification lease deed dated 14.05.2019 cure the deficiency in land availability on the application date?
    Answer: No. Relying on earlier precedent, the Court held that an applicant’s eligibility is judged as on the date of application and subsequent documents cannot alter the position.
  • Issue: Were earlier judgments like Shankar Kumar Bhagat and Priya Kumari applicable to support the petitioner’s case?
    Answer: No. The Court distinguished these cases on facts, noting that in those matters the lease deeds or documents showed present effectiveness and possession, or only a typographical error in plot details, which was not the situation here.

Cases Cited by the Court

  • 2019(4) PLJR 663, Shankar Kumar Bhagat vs. The Indian Oil Corporation & Ors. (distinguished)
  • CWJC No. 7292 of 2020, Priya Kumari vs. Indian Oil Corporation & Ors., judgment dated 14.09.2020 (distinguished)
  • 2009(3) PLJR 591, Neeraj Kumar vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. & Ors. (relied upon for cut-off date principle)
  • CWJC No. 11874 of 2019, Avinash Aarohi vs. The Indian Oil Corporation Limited & Ors., judgment dated 30.07.2019 (treated as squarely covering the present case)

Case Details

Case Number: Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 23654 of 2019

Case Title: Guriya Kumari vs. Indian Oil Corporation Limited & Ors.

Citation: 2022(4) PLJR 325

Court: High Court of Judicature at Patna

Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mohit Kumar Shah

Date of Judgment: 24-12-2021

CAV Date: 17-08-2021

Advocates:

  • For the petitioner: Mr. Siddartha Prasad, Advocate
  • For the respondent Corporation (IOCL): Mr. K.D. Chatterjee, Senior Advocate; Mr. Amlesh Kumar Verma, Advocate

Respondent No. 6: Rani Kumari (successful candidate in fresh draw of lots)

Nature of the Case: Writ petition under civil writ jurisdiction challenging cancellation of LPG distributorship candidature and subsequent draw of lots.

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